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body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville, converging to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg.Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the right wing, Breck-inridge the reserve. Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.’’'’
In the original dispatch, the wo*rds italicised are in General Johnston ’s ownhandwriting. The words, “ the left,” “ the center,” “ the right wing,” “ thereserve,” clearly point to a formation by columns of corps. Moreover, owingto ignorance of the country, the march was so ordered that the corps inter-fered with each other in their advance,and by a detention the battle was delayedan entire day, an almost fatal loss of time.
If it be asked why General Johnston ac-cepted and issued an order of march andbattle which he had not contemplated, thereply is that it had been prepared by hissecond in command, who was presuma-bly more familiar with the country andthe roads than himself, and hence withthe necessities of the case. But the over-ruling reason was the question of time.
Buell was at hand, and Johnston ’s planwas not to manoeuvre, but to attack; andany plan which put him front to frontwith Grant was better than the best twodays later. Besides, the written orderswere not shown him until the morning ofthe 4th, after he had mounted to start to thenear its position on the field. It was then obviously too late to apply a remedy.
General Johnston did not undervalue the importance of details. No manregarded more closely all the details subsidiary to a great result than he.But, important as were the preliminaries,— the maps, the roads, the methodsof putting his army face to face with the enemy, which General Johnston had to take on trust,— he knew that the chief strategy of the battle was inthe decision to fight. Once in the presence of the enemy, he knew that theresult would depend on the way in which his troops were handled. This washis part of the work, and he felt full confidence in his own ability to carry itout successfully. The order was issued, as elaborated by Beauregard, andthe army was moved against the enemy, April 3d, 1862. Said General Bragg:
“ The details of that plan, arranged after General Sidney Johnston decided on deliveringbattle, and had given his instructions, were made up and published to the army in full from theadjutant-general’s office. My first knowledge of them was derived from this general order, theauthorship of which has been claimed by General Beauregard. ... In this ease, as I under-stood then, and still believe, Johnston g-ave verbal instructions for the general movement. . . .Over his [Colonel Jordan, the adjutant-general’s] signature, they reached the army. The generalplan (General Johnston ’s) was admirable— the elaboration simply execrable.
“ When the time arrived for execution, you know well what occurred. In spite of oppositionand prediction of failure, Johnston firmly and decidedly ordered and led the attack in the execu-tion of his general plan, and, notwithstanding the faulty arrangement of troops, was eminentlysuccessful up to the moment of his fall. The victory was icon. How it was lost, the officialreports will show, and history has recorded.” [Bragg to W. P. Johnston , December 16th, 1874.]
LIEUTENANT-GENERA I. VV. J. HARDEE, C. 8. A.FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
front, and when his advance was