THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.

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neer) to inspect the command. His report upon rejoining me about the 17thof February, and that of Captain Harris, regarding the exaggerated exten-sion of the lines, coupled with a faulty location, imperfect command of theriver, and defective organization of the troops, confirmed my opinion thatthe place could not be evacuated too soon. Gleneral Polk, whom I also calledto Jackson, I found possessed with a belief in the defensive capacity of theposition and averse to its abandonment. However, upon my exposition ofits saliency, and the ease with which its communications, both by railwayand water, might be broken, he changed his views. As, meanwhile GleneralJohnston had telegraphed that I must do with respect to Columbus as my“ judgment dictates ”; and also, that “ the separation of our armies is nowcomplete ”; and farther, as upon my report of the situation at Columbus theConfederate War Department had consented, on the 19th of February Gen-eral Polk was directed to prepare to evacuate the position without delay.It was only to be held long enough to remove its invaluable ordnanceto the batteries erected or under construction at Island Number Tenand Madrid Bend, to New Madrid and to Fort Pillow, upon which theultimate defense of the Mississippi River must depend thereafter. Thepreparation of these works for the vital service hoped from them was nowintrusted to Captain D. B. Harris, who subsequently left so brilliant a rec-ord as a consummate engineer at Charleston and Savannah , Drewry’s Bluffand Petersburg.

On the 25th of February commenced the evacuation of a position theattempt to hold which must have resulted in the loss by capture of the corpsof at least 13,000 men thus isolated, or, on the other hand, if left intact oruuassailed by the enemy, must have been rendered wholly unavailable in theformation of a Confederate army for the recovery of what had been latelylost,— a corps without which no such army could have been possibly assem-bled at Corinth as early as the 1st of April, 1862.

Because of a severe bronchial affection contracted by exposure before leav-ing Bowling Green, I had not assumed formal command of the military dis-trict assigned to me, though virtually directing all the movements within it,and arduously endeavoring to become acquainted with the chief points withinits limits,— a course specially requested of me by General Johnston throughhis adjutant-general, in the event that I should not feel “well enough toassume command.”

Meanwhile, threatened by Buell’s presence with a large army in front ofNashville , General Johnston, following the line of retreat (marked out asearly as February 7th) to Stevenson, in north-eastern Alabama , had movedas far in that direction as Murfreesboro ’, where he assembled about 17,000men by the 23d of February, who were there subdivided into 3 divisions eachof 2 brigades, with a “reserve ” under Brigadier-General Breckinridge, andseveral cavalry regiments unattached.

As the system of the “passive defensive” hitherto pursued had only ledus to disaster,—the natural fruits, in fact, of the system,—encouraged by thelatitude that was given me in General Johnston’s telegram of February 18th,