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THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.

I resolved to exert myself to the utmost, despite all that was so unpromising,to secure the means for an aggressive campaign against the enemy, of whoseearly movement up the Tennessee there were already such indications thatthere should he no doubt as to its objective.

But as General Johnston’s projected line of retrograde upon Stevensonmust with each day’s march widen the distance between that army and thecorps of General Polk, while General Grant, naturally flushed with his recentsignal successes, would be left free at any moment to move up the Tennessee to Hamburg or, indeed, to Eastport, and thus, by seizing the Memphis andCharleston railroad, effectually separate and virtually neutralize the two Con-federate armies,—my sole force left available for the protection of thatimportant railway, exclusive of General Polk’s forces at Columbus and else-where, would he but 2500 men under Chalmers, in the quarter of Iuka, with3000 men recently arrived at Corinth from New Orleans , under Buggies.

With a view to avoiding such a catastrophe as the enforced permanentseparation of our two armies, I urged General Johnston, about the 22d ofFebruary, to abandon his line of march toward Stevenson, and to hasten tounite his army with such troops as I might he able to assemble, meanwhile, atthe best point to cover the railroad center at Corinth together with Memphis,while holding Island Number Ten and Fort Pillow. This plan, of course,required more troops than our united armies would supply. Therefore, on the22d of February, I dispatched staff-officers with a circular addressed to thegovernors of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee respecting thesupreme urgency and import of the situation, in all its phases, and invokingtheir utmost exertions to send me, each of them, from 5000 to 10,000 men aswell armed and equipped as possible, enrolled for 90 days, within which period,by timely, vigorous action, I trusted we might recover our losses, and assurethe defense of the Mississippi River . J At the same time I appealed to Gen-eral Bragg for such troops as he could possibly spare temporarily in such anexigency, from Mobile and Pensacola ; and to General Lovell for the like aidfrom New Orleans. To General Van Dorn , represented to have an amiytwenty thousand strong in Arkansas , I likewise sent, on the 21st of February,a most pressing invitation to come in haste to our aid with as many men aspossible, by way of N*ew Madrid. To him I wrote (“ O. R.,” VII., 900): “ Thefate of Missouri necessarily depends on the successful defense of Columbus and of Island Number Ten; hence we must, if possible, combine our opera-tions not only to defend those positions, but also to take the offensive as soonas practicable to recover some lost ground.”

General Johnston acceded to my views and request, though he did notput his troops in motion until the 28th of February, and although heregarded the projected attempt to unite his army with mine a “hazardousexperiment.” \

t See “Military Operations of General Beauro- those who are declaiming against me will begard” (N. Y.: Harper & Brothers), I., 240-241. without an argument.” — “Life of General A. S.

\ “If I join this corps to the forces of Beaure- Johnston.” Letter dated Decatur, Alabama , Marchgard (I confess a hazardous experiment), then 18th, 1802, p. 521.— G. T. B.