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THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.

Richmond it was burned, and with its destruction the coast navy of theConfederates came to an end.

In order to make war on the commerce of the United States , the Con-federacy early resorted to privateering, which was then, as it is now, a legiti-mate practice with all States not parties to the Declaration of Paris . Inaccordance with the President’s proclamation of April 17th, and the Act ofCongress of May 6th, letters of marque were issued by the ConfederateGovernment to owners of private vessels, authorizing them to cruise against theUnited States . Under this authority, more than twenty privateers werefitted out and made cruises during the summer and autumn of 1861, takingsixty or more prizes. The exact number either of privateers or of prizes willprobably never be known. Charleston, New Orleans , and Hatteras Inlet werethe principal centers of privateering operations. Three of the privateers werecaptured,—the Savannah by the brig Perry , the Petrel by the frigate St. Law-rence, and the Beauregard by the hark W. G. Anderson. The cessation of pri-vateering after the first year was brought about by the blockade, which tookaway the profits of the sale of prizes, and such of the privateers as were nottaken into the Government service were converted into blockade-runners.

After privateering came to an end, the Confederate Government dependedalmost wholly upon Europe for sea-going cruisers. These were not privateers,however, but commissioned ships-of-war of the Confederacy. Captain JamesD. Bulloch resided in England as the Confederate naval agent, and his skilland enterprise resulted in the acquisition of the Florida, Alabama , Georgiaand Shenandoah, all of which made successful commerce-destroying cruises.Attempts to secure other vessels, including the Alexandra, the Pampero, theiron-clad contracted for by Captain North on the Clyde, and the two armoredrams built by the Messrs. Laird, failed through the intervention of the BritishGovernment. Of the six vessels built in France , including four corvettes andtwo iron-clads, only one of the latter, Stonewall, passed into the hands of theConfederates, and this was acquired so late in the war as to be of no value.

In its personnel, the Confederate navy was more fortunate than in its ves-sels. The Secretary was Stephen R. Mallory [see p. 106], who had been forseveral years before the war the chairman of the Naval Committee in theSenate, — a position much better calculated to give its holder a knowledge ofthe demands of a modern navy than that which Mr. Welles had filled from1846 to 1849. He entered upon his task with vigor and intelligence, and hewas ably seconded by the officers around him, many of whom had been menof conspicuous ability in the old navy. In the branches of ordnance andtorpedoes he relied largely upon two men, Commander John M. Brooke andLieutenant Hunter Davidson. To Brooke were due the banded guns whichproved of such signal use during the war, while Davidson did much todevelop the torpedo service, 'which probably contributed more to the defenseof the Confederacy than all the vessels of its navy. In 1862, some impatiencew r as shown by the press and the public of the South at the continued succes-sion of naval disasters, and a Congressional committee made an exhaustiveinvestigation of the department. Nothing of importance was disclosed except