THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAUIES.

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the condition of atfairs at New Orleans in 1861-62, already referred to, forwhich the Navy Department was partly responsible, but which was largelyowing to the poverty of Confederate resources.

It was especially in his quick perception of the demands of modern navalwar, and his prompt and bold action to meet these demands, that SecretaryMallory showed his ability and decision of character. No doubt this was ingreat part due to good advisers, but it is not every man who has the wisdomto perceive what good advice is, and the courage to act upon it, where hisaction involves heavy responsibilities. Mr. Mallory’s emphatic recommenda-tions in reference to iron-clads contrast favorably with the halting sugges-tions of Mr. Welles on the same subject. In a letter of May 8th, 1861, to Mr.Conrad, the chairman of the Naval Committee, Mallory presents with precisionand force the history of the development of armored vessels, stating accuratelythe essential facts, which certainly were either not known or not appreciatedat Washington. He closes his letter with these remarkable words:

“ I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity. Such avessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States , prevent all blockade,and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire navy.

“ If, to cope with them upon the sea, we follow their example, and build wooden ships, weshall have to construct several at one time, for one or two ships would fall an easy prey to hercomparatively numerous steam-frigates. But inequality of numbers may be compensated byinvulnerability, and thus not only does economy, but naval success, dictate the wisdom andexpediency of fighting with iron against wood without regard to first cost.

“ Naval engagements between wooden frigates as they are now built and armed will proveto be the forlorn hopes of the sea—simply contests in which the question, not of victory, butwho shall go to the bottom first is to be solved.

“ Should the committee deem it expedient to begin at once the construction of such a ship,not a moment should be lost.”

The result was that early in July the Merrimac had been raised anddocked, the details of the plan of reconstruction had been completed, andthe work had been begun without waiting for an appropriation. This earlystart enabled her to destroy the Congress and the Cumberland unopposed.

The number of officers who left the United States navy, either by resigna-tion or dismissal, to join the Southern cause, was 322, of whom 243 were line-officers. In the beginning they were attached to the separate State organiza-tions, but during the spring of 1861 they were gradually enrolled in the navyof the Confederate States. In 1863 a naval academy was established underthe command of Captain W. H. Parker, on board the Patrick Henry in theJames River, which turned out excellent junior officers. The personnel ofthe Confederate navy was distinguished by enterprise, originality, andresource, and to it were due some of the most gallant episodes of the war.

In seamen the South was deficient, not having a seafaring population.The number of enlisted men in the navy at any given time was probablyless than four thousand, but as it took the offensive only in detached enter-prises, no very extensive force was required. The four principal commerce-destroyers were chiefly manned by foreign sailors.