MCCLELLAN ORGANIZING THE GRAND ARMY.

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encouragement was most affectionate, his reprimand couched in terms ofperfect politeness. Discreet, as a military or political chief should be, he wasslow in bestowing his confidence; but, once given, it was never withdrawn.Himself perfectly loyal to his friends, he knew how to inspire others with anabsolute devotion.

Unfortunately for himself, McClellan succeeded too quickly and too soon tothe command of the principal army of the republic. His lieutenants were asnew to the work as he — they had not been tested. Public opinion in thearmy itself — a judge all the more relentless for the very reason that disciplinegives it no opportunity to express itself — had as yet been able neither to pro-nounce on them, nor to ratify the preferences of the general-in-chief. Para-doxical as it may seem, would it not really have been better could McClellanhave received a check at first, as Grant did at Belmont, rather than to havebegun with the brilliant campaign in West Virginia which won for him thesobriquet of “The Young Napoleon”! Just at the time when I joined hisstaff the exacting confidence of the people and the Government was laying onhim an almost superhuman task. In forging the puissant weapon which,later, snatched from his grasp, was destined, in the hands of the GreatHammerer, to bray the army of Lee, he acquired an imperishable title to thegratitude of his compatriots. He wrought, will it be said, for the glory ofhis successors! No ! He labored for his country, even as a private soldierwho dies for her, with no thought of fame. In order to give to his weaponevery perfection, he soon learned to resist the impatient solicitations of boththe people and the Government.

At the end of September, 1861, while yet under the orders of General Scott,McClellan represented the ardent and impatient spirit of men chafing at theslowness of a chief whose faculties had been chilled by the infirmities of age.

Nevertheless, McClellan’s first care was to place the capital beyond all perad-venture of being carried by sudden attack: on the one hand, for the sake ofreassuring the inhabitants and the political organism within its limits; and,on the other, that the army might be at liberty to act independently when itshould be called to the field, leaving a sufficient garrison only to secure thedefense of the city. He knew that an army tied up about a place it has to pro-tect is virtually paralyzed. The events of 1870 have only too fully confirmedthis view. An engineer of distinction, McClellan himself devised in all itsdetails the system of defensive works from Alexandria to Georgetown. He gavehis daily personal supervision to the execution of this work, alternating outdooractivity with office business. Tireless in the saddle, he was equally indefati-gable with the pen. Possessed of a methodical and exact mind, he compre-hended the organization of his army in every minute detail. The creation ofall the material of war necessary to its existence and action was extraordinaryproof of the wonderful readiness of the Americans in an emergency. . . .

But the season advanced. The army was being formed. At the end ofSeptember the enemy had fallen back on Fairfax Court House, leavingto us at Munson’s Hill a few Quaker guns of logs and pasteboard. The time foraction seemed to have come. The rigors of winter in Virginia hardly make