MCCLELLAN ORGANIZING THE GRAND ARMY.

114

themselves felt before the beginning of December. By the 17th of Octoberthe enemy had again retreated. The Army of the Potomac replied with a com-mensurate advance. But this was a faux pas. The blunder was consummatedat Ball’s Bluff [see p. 122], McClellan’s orders had been given in entireignorance of the topography of the environs of Edwards’s Ferry (all the mapsbeing inexact) and of the force of the enemy in front of Leesburg. In fact,at that time the organization of the secret service was entirely insufficientto the occasion, in spite of the praiseworthy efforts of Mr. Allen Pinkerton . JMcClellan, who was established beyond Dranesville with McCall’s division,believed himself to be within supporting distance of Baker’s brigade. Thelatter was crushed on the 21st, before any one on the right bank of the Poto-mac knew of his fate. This disaster, of comparatively little moment by itself,led to the most acrimonious recriminations. It proved, above all, how slightand imperfect were the connections between the head of the army and theparts he was called on to manoeuvre. On that day a fatal hesitation tookpossession of McClellan. If he did not then decide to postpone the campaigntill the following spring, his conduct of affairs was such as soon to leavehim no alternative but recourse to this lamentable necessity. Shortlythereafter a great change came over the military situation : a change whichshould have encouraged him to the promptest offensive action, but which,unfortunately for him, produced only a directly contrary result.

On the evening of November 1st the whole political world of Washingtonwas in a flutter of agitation. It labored still under the effects of the displace-ment of General Fremont, guilty of having intruded upon political ground bythe issue of an abolitionist proclamation [see Vol. I., p. 278]. The disgraceof “The Pathfinder,” so popular with the Western Republicans, had causedsome friction in Congress , and had provoked rejoicing among his numerouspolitical enemies in the Army of the Potomac; and now it was learned that ameasure of still graver importance had been forced on the Government:Scott had resigned his commission as commander-in-chief of the Federalarmies, 5 , the natural inference being that McClellan would be designatedhis successor. Of great stature and of a martial figure, General Scott

J Usually mentioned in the Official Records underthe assumed name of E. J. Allen, — Editors.

& Early in August, 1861, General Scott hadasked to he relieved. His request grew out of theirritation caused by a letter McClellan had ad-dressed to him on August 8th, in which the juniorofficer gave his opinion that the enemy had atleast 100,000 men in front of Washington, or inthe vicinity, and put himself on record as to themeasures (including an enlargement of his owncommand ) deemed by him necessary for the safetyof Washington. On the following day, August9th, General Scott addressed the following letterto the Secretary of War :

“Sir: I received yesterday from Major-General Mc-Clellan. a letter of that date, to which I design this as myonly reply. Had Major-General McClellan presentedthe same views in person, they would have been freelyentertained and discussed. All my military views and

opinions had been so presented to him, without elicitingmuch remark, in our few meetings, which I have in vainsought to multiply. He has stood on his guard, and nowplaces himself on record. Let him make the most of hisunenvied advantages. Major-General McClellan haspropagated in high quarters the idea expressed in theletter before me, that Washington was not only ‘in-secure,’ but in ‘imminent danger.’ Relying on ournumbers, our forts, and the Potomac River , I am con-fident in the opposite opinion; and considering thestream of new regiments that is pouring in upou us(before this alarm could have reached tlieir homes), Ihave not the slightest apprehension for the safety of theGovernment here.

“ Having now been long unable to mount ahorse, or towalk more than a few paces at a time, and consequentlybeing unable to review troops, much less to direct themin battle,—in short, being broken down by many partic-ular hurts, besides the general infirmities of age, — I feelthat I have become au incumbrance to the army as wellas to myself, and that T ought, giving way to a youngercommander, to seek the palliatives of physical pain andexhaustion. Accordingly, I must beg the President, at