THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

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QUARTERMASTER’S DOCK, FORT MONROE. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1862.

a general advance of the Army of the Potomac, driving the enemy hack of theRapidan. My own view was that the movement of the Army of the Potomacfrom Urbana would accomplish both of these objects, by forcing the enemyto abandon all his positions and fall back on Richmond. I was thereforeunwilling to interfere with this plan by a premature advance, the effect ofwhich must be either to commit us to the overland route, or to minimize theadvantages of the Urbana movement. I wished to hold the enemy atManassas to the last moment—if possible until the advance from Urbanahad actually commenced, for neither the reopening of the railroad nor thedestruction of the batteries was worth the danger involved.

The positive order of the President, probably issued under the pressure ofthe Secretary of War, forced me to undertake the opening of the railway.For this purpose I went to Harper’s Ferry in February, intending to throwover a force sufficient to occupy Winchester. To do this it was necessary tohave a reliable bridge across the Potomac — to insure supplies and promptreenforcements. The pontoon-bridge, thrown as a preliminary, could not beabsolutely trusted on a river so liable to heavy freshets; therefore it wasdetermined to construct a canal-boat bridge. It was discovered, however,when the attempt was made, that the lift-lock from the canal to the river wastoo narrow for the boats by some four or five inches, and I therefore decidedto rebuild the railroad bridge, and content myself with occupying Charlestownuntil its completion, postponing to the same time the advance to Winchester.I had fully explained my intentions to the President and Secretary beforeleaving Washington, providing for precisely such a contingency. While atHarper’s Ferry I learned that the President was dissatisfied with my action,and on reaching Washington I laid a full explanation before the Secretary,with which he expressed himself entirely satisfied, and told me that thePresident was already so, and that it was unnecessary for me to communicatewith him on the subject. I then proceeded with the preparations necessaryto force the evacuation of the Potomac batteries. On the very day appointedfor the division commanders to come to headquarters to receive their finalorders, the President sent for me. I then learned that he had received