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no explanation of the Harper’s Ferry affair, and that the Secretary was notauthorized to make the statement already referred to; but after my repetitionof it the President became fully satisfied with my course. He then, however,said that there was another “very ugly matter” which he desired to talkabout, and that was the movement by the lower Chesapeake. He said that ithad been suggested that I proposed this movement with the “traitorous”purpose of leaving Washington uncovered and exposed to attack. I very•promptly objected to the coupling of any such adjective with my purposes,whereon he disclaimed any intention of con veying the idea that he expressedhis own opinion, as he merely repeated the suggestions of others. I thenexplained the purpose and effect of fortifying Washington, and, as I thought,removed his apprehensions, but informed him that the division commanderswere to be at headquarters that morning, and suggested that my plans shouldbe laid before them that they might give their opinion as to whether the capi-tal would be endangered; I also said that in order to leave them perfectlyuntrammeled I would not attend the meeting. Accordingly they met on the■8th of March and approved my plans.
On the same day was issued, without my knowledge, the order formingarmy corps and assigning the senior general officers to their command. %My own views were that, as the command of army corps involved greatresponsibility and demanded ability of a high order, it was safer to postponetheir formation until trial in the field had shown which general officers couldbest perform those vital functions. An incompetent division commandercould not often jeopardize the safety of an army; while an unfit corps com-mander could easily lose a battle and frustrate the best-conceived plan ofcampaign. Of the four corps commanders, one only had commanded somuch as a regiment in the field prior to the Bull Run campaign. On thenext day intelligence arrived that the enemy was abandoning his positions.I crossed to the Virginia side to receive information more promptly anddecide upon what should be done. During the night I determined to advancethe whole army, to take advantage of any opportunity to strike the enemy,to break up the permanent camps, give the troops a little experience on themarch and in bivouac, get rid of extra baggage, and test the working of thestaff-departments. If this were done at all, it must be done promptly, andby moving the troops by divisions, without waiting to form the army corps.Accordingly, I telegraphed to the Secretary, explaining the state of the caseand asking authority to postpone the army corps formation until the com-pletion of the movement. The reply was an abrupt and unreasonablerefusal. I again telegraphed, explaining the situation and throwing theresponsibility upon the Secretary, whereupon he gave way.
Meanwhile, as far back as the 27th of February, orders had been given forcollecting the transportation necessary to carry out the Urbana movement.
& First Corps, McDowell— Divisions: Franklin, Couch , Smith, and Casey. The reserve artilleryMcCall, and King ; Second Corps, Sumner — Divi- (Henry J. Hunt ), the regular infantry (Georgesions: Richardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick; Third Sykes), and regular cavalry (Philip St. GeorgeCorps, Heintzelman — Divisions: Porter, Hooker, Cooke) and engineer troops were attached toand Hamilton; Fourth Corps, Keyes — Divisions: headquarters.— Editors.