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either by joining in the attack or by running by them and gaining their rear.As transports arrived very slowly, especially those for horses, and the greatimpatience of the Government grew apace, it became necessary to embarkdivisions as fast as vessels arrived, and I decided to land them at Fort Mon-roe, holding the First Corps to the last, still intending to move it in massto turn Gloucester. On the 17th of March the leading division embarked atAlexandria. The campaign was undertaken with the intention of takingsome 145,000 troops, to be increased by a division of 10,000 drawn from thetroops in the vicinity of Fort Monroe, giving a total of 155,000. Strenuousefforts were made to induce the President to take away Blenker’s Germandivision of 10,000 men. Of his own volition he at first declined, but theday before I left Washington he yielded to the non-military pressure andreluctantly gave the order, thus reducing the expected force to 145,000.
While at Fairfax Court House, on the 12th of March, I learned that therehad appeared in the daily papers the order relieving me from the generalcommand of all the armies and confining my authority to the Department ofthe Potomac. I had received no previous intimation of the intention of theGovernment in this respect. Thus, when I embarked for Fort Monroe onthe 1st of April, my command extended from Philadelphia to Richmond ,from the Alleghanies, including the Shenandoah, to the Atlantic; for anorder had been issued a few days previous placing Fort Monroe and theDepartment of Virginia under my command, and authorizing me to with-draw from the troops therein ten thousand, to form a division to be addt dto the First Corps.
The fortifications of Washington were at this time completed and armed.I had already given instructions for the refortification of Manassas , the reopen-ing of the Manassas Gap Railroad, the protection of its bridges by block-houses, the intrenchment of a position for a brigade at or near the railroadcrossing of the Shenandoah, and an intrenched post at Chester Gap. I leftabout 42,000 troops for the immediate defense of Washington, and more than35,000 for the Shenandoah Valley — an abundance to insure the safety ofWashington and to check any attempt to recover the lower Shenandoah andthreaten Maryland . Beyond this force, the reserves of the Northern Stateswere all available.
On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I found five divisionsof infantry, Sykes’s brigade of regulars, two regiments of cavalry, and a por-tion of the reserve artillery disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and apart of a fourth had arrived, but were still on shipboard; comparatively fewwagons had come. On the same day came a telegram stating that the Depart-ment of Virginia was withdrawn from my control, and forbidding me to formthe division of ten thousand men without General Wool’s sanction. I wasthus deprived of the command of the base of operations, and the ultimatestrength of the army was reduced to 135,000—another serious departure fromthe plan of campaign. Of the troops disembarked, only four divisions, theregulars, the majority of the reserve artillery, and a part of the cavalry, couldbe moved, in consequence of the lack of transportation. Casey’s division was