THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

169

HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL HEINTZELMAN, COMMANDING THE THIRD ARMY CORPS AT HOWE’S SAW-MILL ,BEFORE YORKTOWN [SEE MAP, P. 188j. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

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unable to leave Newport News until the 16th, from the impossibility ofsupplying it with wagons.

The best information obtainable represented the Confederate troops aroundYorktown as numbering at least fifteen thousand, with about an equal forceat Norfolk; and it was clear that the army lately at Manassas , now mostlynear Gordonsvilie, was in position to be thrown promptly to the Peninsula.It was represented that Yorktown was surrounded by strong earth-works, andthat the Warwick River, instead of stretching across the Peninsula to York-town,— as proved to be the case,— came down to Lee’s Mills from the North,running parallel with and not crossing the road from Newport News to Will-iamsburg . It was also known that there were intrenched positions of moreor less strength at Young’s Mills, on the Newport News road, and at BigBethel, Howard’s Bridge, and Ship’s Point, on or near the Hampton andYorktown road, and at Williamsburg [see map, p. 188].

On my arrival at Fort Monroe, I learned, in an interview with Flag-Officer Goldsborough, that he could not protect the James as a line of supply,and that he could furnish no vessels to take an active part in the reduction ofthe batteries at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain their rear. Hecould only aid in the final attack after our land batteries had essentiallysilenced their fire.

I thus found myself with 53,000 men in condition to move, faced bythe conditions of the problem just stated. Information was received thatYorktown was already being reenforced from Norfolk , and it was appre-hended that the main Confederate army would promptly follow the samecourse. I therefore determined to move at once with the force in hand, andendeavor to seize a point — near the Halfway House — between Yorktown

VOL. II. 12