170
and Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, andthus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and prevent the arrival ofreenforcements. The advance commenced on the morning of the 4th of April,and was arranged to turn successively the intrenchments on the two roads ;the result being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the Third Corps wasengaged with the enemy’s outposts in front of Yorktown and under the artil-lery tire of the place. The Fourth Corps came upon Lee’s Mills and found itcovered by the unfordable line of the Warwick, and reported the position sostrong as to render it impossible to execute its orders to assault [see map,p. 188]. Thus, all things were brought to a stand-still, and the intendedmovement on the Halfway House could not be carried out. Just at thismoment came a telegram, dated the 4th, informing me that the First Corpswas withdrawn from my command. Thus, when too deeply committed torecede, I found that another reduction of about 43,000, including severalcavalry regiments withheld from me, diminished my paper force to 92,000,instead of the 155,000 on which the plans of the campaign had been founded,and with which it was intended to operate. The number of men left behind,sick and from other causes incident to such a movement, reduced the totalfor duty to some 85,000, from which must be deducted all camp, depot, andtrain guards, escorts, and non-combatants, such as cooks, servants, orderlies,and extra-duty men in the various staff-departments, which reduced the num-bers actually available for battle to some 67,000 or 68,000.
The order withdrawing the First Corps also broke up the Department of thePotomac, forming out of it the Department of the Shenandoah, under GeneralBanks, and the Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell,the latter including Washington. I thus lost all control of the depots atWashington, as I had already been deprived of the control of the base atFort Monroe and of the ground subsequently occupied by the depot atWhite House . The only territory remaining under my command was thepaltry triangle between the departments of the Rappahannock and Virginia ;even that was yet to be won from the enemy. I was thus relieved from theduty of providing for the safety of Washington, and deprived of all controlover the troops in that vicinity. Instead of one directing head controllingoperations which should have been inseparable, the region from the Allegha-nies to the sea was parceled out among four independent commanders.
On the 3d of April, at the very moment of all others when it was most nec-essary to push recruiting most vigorously, to make good the inevitable lossesin battle and by disease, an order was issued from the War Department dis-continuing all recruiting for the volunteers and breaking up all their recruit-ing stations. Instead of a regular and permanent system of recruiting, whetherhy voluntary enlistment or by draft, a spasmodic system of large drafts wasthereafter resorted to, and, to a great extent, the system of forming newregiments. The results were wasteful and pernicious. There were enough,or nearly enough, organizations in the field, and these should have beenconstantly maintained at the full strength by a regular and constant influxof recruits, who, by association with their veteran comrades, would soon