210

MANASSAS TO SEVEN PINES.

My position as yonr staff-officer justifies me in saying that Mr. McFarlandwas not with you in any capacity.”

Surgeon A. M. Fauntleroy, in answer to my question, “ Had I a volunteeraide-de-camp in May, 1862, especially when the army was moving from York-town toward Richmond ; or did you ever in that time see an old gentlemanof Richmond , named McFarland, about my headquarters t ” writes:

“ I never did. I cannot well see how such a person could have escaped my observation, ifhe was there at any time.”

And J. B. Washington, president of the Baltimore and Philadelphia Rail-way, writes me as follows:

“ Yon had not on your staff after leaving Manassas a volunteer aide-de-camp, especially dur-ing May, 1862, when the army was between Yorktown and Richmond. I was personallyacquainted with Mr. McFarland of Richmond , but never saw him at our headquarters, nor heardof his ever having been there. Having served as aide-de-camp on your staff from May, 1861,to February, 1864, I was in the position to know of the circumstances of which I have written.”

t

Mr. Davis says:

“ Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance ... I sent for General Lee . . .and told him why and how I was dissatisfied with the condition of affairs. He asked me whatI thought it was proper to do. ... I answered that McClellan should be attacked on theother side of the Chickahominy, before he matured his preparations for a siege of Richmond .To this he promptly assented. . . . He then said: ‘General Johnston should, of course,

advise you of what he expects or proposes to do. Let me go and see him.’ . . . "When

General Lee came back, he told me that General Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday, tomove against the enemy, as follows: ‘ General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flankand rear of the enemy. General G. W". Smith, as soon as Hill ’s guns opened, was to cross theChickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and, by the conjunction ofthe two, it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanics-ville bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped by both ofus” [II., 120],

It is certain that General Lee could have had no such hopes from this plan,nor have been a party to it; for it would not only have sent our army wherethere was no enemy, but left open the way to Richmond . For the MeadowBridge is 2J miles from Mechanicsville, and that place about 6 miles abovethe Federal right. So, after two-thirds of our troops had crossed the Chicka-hominy, the Federal army could have marched straight to Richmond , opposedby not more than one-fifth of its number in Magruder’s and D. H. Hill ’sdivisions. This plan is probably the wildest on record.

As to what is described [II., 121], G. W. Smith’s division was never in theplace indicated, and General Longstreet’s was never on the Mechanicsvilleroad near the bridge, before General Lee crossed the Chickahominy to fightat Gaines’s Mills.

A glance at the map will show how singularly incorrect is Mr. Davis’sdescription [II., 122-3] of the vicinity of Seven Pines and of the dispositionof the Federal troops.

On the 23d of May, Keyes’s Federal corps crossed to the south side of theChickahominy, and a detachment attacked Hatton’s Confederate brigade,which was in observation near Savage’s Station. The detachment was driven