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back, and Hatton’s object having been accomplished (to learn whether theenemy had crossed the stream), he was recalled. I was advised to hold thatposition with the army, but preferred to let the enemy advance, which wouldincrease the interval between his left and the right, which was beyond theChickahominy. McDowell’s corps of 40,000 men J, was then at Freder-icksburg , observed by a division under Brigadier-General J. R. Anderson;and a large Confederate brigade, under Brigadier-General Branch, was atGordonsville.
On the 24th our cavalry was driven across the Chickahominy, principallyat Mechanicsville. This extension of the right wing of the enemy to thewest made me apprehend that the two detachments (Anderson and Branch)above mentioned might be cut off. They were therefore ordered to fallback to the Chickahominy. Near Hanover Court House the brigade wasattacked by Porter’s corps and driven off, escaping with a loss of 66 killed,and 177 wounded, as General Branch reported. | A division was formed ofAnderson’s and Branch’s troops, to the command of which Major-General A. P. Hill was assigned.
That evening General Anderson sent word that his scouts left near Freder-icksburg reported that McDowell’s troops were marching southward. As theobject of this march was evidently the junction of this corps with the mainarmy, I determined to attack McClellan before McDowell could join him; andthe major-generals were desired to hold their troops ready to move. But atnight, when those officers were with me to receive instructions for the ex-pected battle, General J. E. B. Stuart, who also had a detachment of cavalryobserving McDowell’s corps, reported that it had returned to Fredericksburg .As my object was to bring on the inevitable battle before McClellan shouldreceive an addition of 40,000 men to his forces, this intelligence made mereturn to my first design — that of attacking McClellan’s left wing on theWilliamsburg road as soon as, by advancing, it had sufficiently increased itsdistance from his right, north of the Chickahominy.
The morning of the 30th, armed reconnoissances were made under GeneralD. H. Hill ’s direction—on the Charles City road by Brigadier-General Rodes,and on the Williamsburg road by Brigadier-General Garland. The latterfound Federal outposts five miles from Richmond — or two miles west ofSeven Pines — in such strength as indicated that a corps was near. On receiv-ing this information from General Hill, I informed him that he would lead anattack on the enemy next morning. Orders were given for the concentrationof twenty-two of our twenty-eight brigades against McClellan’s left wing,about two-fifths of his army. Our six other brigades were guarding the riverfrom New Bridge to Meadow Bridge, on our extreme left. Longstreet andHuger were directed to conduct their divisions to D. H. Hill ’s position on theWilliamsburg road, and G. W. Smith to march with his to the junction
McDowell says, May 22d, 1862, “ Official Rec- compute by the basis on which the Confederate gen-ords,” Vol. XII., Part III., p. 214, that he would re- erals always estimated their strength.— Editors.quire subsistence for 38,000 men. This included 4-® xe ' us i ve of the loss of the 28th Noith Caro-both effectives and non-effectives. A fairdeduction lina, of Lane’s command, which as far as reportedwould]eaveMcDowellabout35,000combatants,to was 7 killed and 15 wounded.— Editors.