HANOVER COURT HOUSE AND GAINES’S MILL.
3 2 4
stream, from New Bridge to White Oak Swamp, leaving north of the riveronly the Fifth Army Corps. The Confederate troops faced the Federal armythroughout its length, from White Oak Swamp to New Bridge, and thence upthe right bank of the Chickahominy, covering the important crossings atMeehan icsville and Meadow Bridge, north of the city.
South of the Chickahominy each army was secured against surprise in flankor successful attack in front by that swollen stream; by marshy lands andmuddy roads ; by redoubts studded with artillery and rifle-pits well manned,all flanked or covered by swamps, tangled thickets, and slashed timber. Not-withstanding the apparent quiet, both armies were actively engaged in theerection of those defensive works which permit large forces to be detached, atopportune moments, for aggressive action, or for the defense of menacedpositions. These preparations for offensive and defensive action, knownto both commanders, plainly impressed on each the necessity of guardingagainst any errors in position, and the importance of preparing promptly totake advantage of any opening in his opponent’s, line which promised resultscommensurate with the risks involved.
It was apparent to both generals that Richmond could only be taken in one ;
of two ways: by regular approaches, or by assault. An assault would requiresuperior forces, supported by ample reserves. It was equally apparent thatan attack could readily be made from Richmond , because that city’s wellarmed and manned intrenchments would permit its defense by a small 1number of men, while large forces could be concentrated and detached for joffensive operations. I
The faulty location of the Union army, divided as it was by the Chickahom- jiny, was from the first realized by General McClellan , and became daily anincreasing cause of care and anxiety to him; not the least disturbing element J
of which was the impossibility of quickly reenforcing his right wing or j
promptly drawing it to the south bank. That this dilemma was known to so ;intelligent and vigilant a commander as General Lee could not be doubted; ■
and that it was certainly demonstrated to him by General J. E. B, Stuart’sdashing cavalry raid around the Union army, on June 14th, was shown inmany ways. [See page 271.] One evidence of it was his immediate erec-tion of field-works on his left, and his increasing resistance to the efforts ofUnion scouts to penetrate into the roads leading to Richmond from the north.This indicated that Lee was preparing to guard against the reenforcementof McClellan ’s right, and also against information reaching us of Confederatereenforcements from the north.
McClellan had been forced into this faulty position on the Chickahominyand held there by the oft-repeated assurances that McDowell’s corps of 40,000men, then at Fredericksburg, would be advanced to Richmond and formed on |his immediate right, which would make that wing safe. J) On the 27th of May,under promise that McDowell would join him at once, McClellan cleared hisfront of all opposition to his rapid march, by operations at Hanover Court