HANOVER COURT HOUSE AND GAINES’S MILL.

House. If McDowell had joined McClellan then, it would have resulted inthe capture of Richmond . That junction could also easily have been broughtabout immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks, and even then Richmond could have been taken. But the Confederate authorities so skillfully usedJackson, in the Valley of Virginia, as to drawoff McDowell; while thefears of the Administration, then aroused for the safety of Washington,together with a changed policy, caused him to be held back from the Armyof the Potomac; and, although orders were several times issued requiringMcDowell to unite with McClellan , and assurances were given as late as June26th that he would so unite, yet he never arrived, and the right wing ofMcClellan’s army, then left exposed, became the object of attack. McClellan saw the coining storm, and guarded against it as best he could. Realizing thefaultiness of his position, resulting from McDowell’s withdrawal to the north,he desired to correct the error by changing his base from York River to theJames, where he could be easily reenforced, and from which point his com-munications would be safe. This change could not be made so long asMcDowell’s advance was to be expected, nor in any event could it be effectedwithout great risk to the safety of his own army in the face of a vigilantand active foe, and without seriously jeopardizing the success of the cause towhich he was devoting all his energies. He, however, secured by carefulexamination full information of the roads and the character of the countryover which he would be obliged to move, if circumstances or policy shouldrequire a change of base, and as early as June 18th sent vessels loadedwith supplies to the James River.

In the middle of June General McClellan intrusted to me the manage-ment of affairs on the north bank of the Chickahominy, and confided tome his plans as well as his hopes and apprehensions. His plans embraceddefensive arrangements against an attack from Richmond upon our weak rightflank. We did not fear the results of such an attack if made by the forcesfrom Richmond alone; but if, in addition, we were to be attacked by Jack-son’s forces, suspicions of whose approach were already aroused, we felt thatwe should be in peril. But as Jackson had thus far prevented McDowell fromjoining us, we trusted that McDowell, Banks , and Fremont, who had beendirected to watch Jackson, would be able to prevent him from joining Lee,or, at least, would give timely warning of his escape from their front andfollow close upon his heels.

With McClellan ’s approval, my command was distributed as follows:

General Geo. G. Meade’s brigade of General Geo. A. McCall’s division of Penn-sylvania Reserves was posted at Gaines’s house, protecting a siege-batterycontrolling New Bridge; Generals John F. Reynolds’s and Truman Seymour ’sbrigades held the rifle-pits skirting the east bank of Beaver Dam Creekand the field-works covering the only crossings near Mechanicsville andEllerson’s Mill. These field-works, well armed with artillery, and the rifle-pits, well manned, controlled the roads and open fields on the west bankof that creek, and were concealed by timber and brush from an approachingfoe. The infantry outposts from the same division, and their supports,