THE CHARGE OP COOKE’S CAVALRY AT GAINES’S MILL.
BY PHILIP ST. GEORGE COOKE, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
I N “The Century” for June, 1885, there is anarticle on the battle of Gaines’s Mill, signed byFitz John Porter , in which appear singular errorsof statement regarding the action of the “CavalryReserve,” affecting also the conduct and reputa-tion of its commander. He says [see p. 340 of thepresent volume] :
“We lost In all twenty-two cannon; some of thesebroke down while we were withdrawing, and some ranoff the bridges at night while we were crossing to thesouth bank of the Chickahominy. The loss of the gunswas due to the fact that some of Cooke’s cavalry, whichhad been directed to be kept, under all circumstances,in the valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent toresist an attack of the enemy upon our left. The charge,executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry andin the midst of our heavy cannonading as well as thatof the enemy, resulted, as should have been expected,in confusion. The bewildered and uncontrollable horseswheeled about, and, dashing through the batteries, satis-fied the gunners that they were charged by the enemy.To this alone I always attributed the failure on our partlonger to hold the battle-field, and to bring off all ourguns [with few exceptions J] in an orderly retreat. Mostunaccountably this cavalry was not used to cover ourretreat or gather the stragglers, but was peremptorilyordered to cross to the south bank of the river.” [Foot-note: “See ‘Official Records,’ Vol. XI., Part II., pp. 43,223, 273, 282.—F. J. P.”]
To silence forever the injurious statements andinsinuation of the last sentence, I give here evidenceof two witnesses who were present, and whose highcharacter is known to all. Major-General WesleyMerritt, colonel Fifth Cavalry, superintendentUnited States Military Academy, writes me, April8th, 1885:
“ The cavalry remained, with you in immediate com-mand, on that portion of the field, until after midnighton the 27th of June, 1862. It provided litter-bearers andlantern-bearers for our surgeons who went over the fieldof battle, succoring and attending the wounded. . . .The cavalry was the last force to leave the field and tocross the Chickahominy, and the bridge on which itcrossed, between 12 midnight on the 27th and 2 A. m. onthe 28 th of June, was, I think, rendered impassable byyour order.”
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Martin, assist-ant adjutant-general United States Army , wroteme from Fort Leavenworth, April 30tli, 1885 :
“ The artillery did not drive the enemy from his front;the enemy was not driven from his front, but the chargeof your cavalry did stop the advance of the enemy, and
i Insertion by General Porter in the revision of liis articlefor the present work.— editors.
Major William II . Powell, of the 4th Regular Infantry,wrote to the Editors on September8th, 1885 : “ Probably notmuch credit attaches to the particular organized force whichwas the last to cross the Chickahominy River after the battleof Gaines’s Mill; but in older to settle the question I desireto state that the cavalry was not the last to cross the river —even if they did leave at the time General Merritt states.The 4th United States Infantry was the last organizationwhich crossed, and that regiment passed over about twohours after daylight on the morning of the 28tli, and a bridgehad to be. partly relaid to enable it to do so. This regi-ment was posted on the extreme right flank of the army atthe battle of Gaines’s Mill, and was ordered to support Weed’sbattery. Weed was afterward reenforced by Tidball’s bat-tery, and the 4th Infantry held its position from the com-mencement of the engagement (about. 11 a. m.) until twilightof the 27th, without receiving an order or stirring from its
this enabled Porter ’s troops to get off the field. I am byno means alone in the belief that the charge of the cav-alry at Gaines’s Mill, on June 27tli, 1862, saved Fitz JohnPorter 's corps from destruction. . . . You did notdirect your command at once to cross the river. Therewere no frightened men in your vicinity. All the fright-ened men were far to yo.ur right; you could not havereached the retiring crowd; and if you could havestopped them, you •could have done more than Porter himself did do, and he was amidst them, for I saw him.Your command, at least a part of it, was the very last tocross the river.”
It should he observed that in the short extractfrom “ The Century,” above, General Porter repeatsthe assertion that the cavalry caused the loss ofthe (22) guns,— emphasizes, makes plainer, themeaning of the opening sentence: to the charge“ alone I always attributed the failure on our partto longer hold the battle-field and to bring off allour guns in an orderly retreat.”
Captain W. C. Weeden, commanding Battery C,1st Rhode Island Artillery, reports, Vol.XI., Pt. II.,p. 282, “Official Records,” the loss of a section bystress of the enemy’s attacks; the two other sec-tions “ held in support in rear of Griffin’s brigade ”opened fire; “The smoke had filled the whole fieldto the woods, and it was impossible to direct thefire. The batteries were limbering to the rear ingood order” when, he says, the cavalry fugitivesran through them, but he only lost one more piece“mired in the woods.” But General Griffin re-ports that the artillery “opened fire upon theenemy advancing upon our left; but it was toolate ; our infantry had already begun to fall back,and nothing being left to give confidence to theartillerymen, it was impossible to make themstand to their work.” And that was just when thecavalry did go in and give confidence to the threebatteries on the left, and the saving work was done.
I have examined the “Official Records” andfound reports of about twenty batteries engagedin the battle, and the above is the only mention ofthe cavalry fugitives to be found in them; theirlosses are attributed to other causes. Here I willgive the account of the loss of whole batteries :
General Truman Seymour reports, p. 402, ofCaptain Easton, “This gallant gentleman fell andhis battery was lost with him.”
position until Weed reported that be had no more ammu-nition, and retired from the field by way of tlio Cold Harborroad, covered by the 4th Infantry. Night came upon theregiment as it was retiring on this road. It went into bivouacin line of battle, in the Cliickaliominy Valley, on the road bywhich it retired from the field. When daylight came we ex-pected orders to renew the engagement, and took up ourmarch to return to the battle-field, about a mile and a halfdistant. It was then that some wounded were met, who in-formed us that all the army had crossed during the night. Wethen marched from Grapevine Bridge to Alexander’s Bridge,in sight of the enemy’s pickets, and when we arrived on thesouth side we were astonished to find that it was thought wehad been captured. We learned afterward that orders , hadbeen sent to The 4th Infantry during the action, but the offi-cer who started with them was killed; another who tookthem was wounded before they could be delivered, and anorderly who was subsequently dispatched with them didnot arrive at his destination, and was never heard of after-ward.”
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