THE CHARGE OF COOKE’S CAVALRY AT GAINES’S MILL.
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Captain Mark Kerns was wounded, but “ loadedand fired the last shots himself, and brought fourof the guns off the field.” Of another battery hereports, “No efforts could now repel the rush of asuccessful foe, under whose fire rider and horsewent down, and guns lay immovable on the field.”
Captain J. H. Cooper, Battery B, 1st Pennsyl-vania Artillery, reports, p. 410:
“ The remaining infantry falling hack, we were com-pelled to retire from our guns. The charge being toosudden and overpowering, it was impossible to removethem, many of the horses being killed by the enemy’stire.”
Was General Porter prevented from bringing offall these guns by the cavalry charge ?
“Just preceding this break” (in Morell’s line) “I sawcavalry, which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbersthrough our lines on the left.”
All the evidence goes to disprove this very de-liberate statement, and that all the infantry onthe left had broken and was fast disappearingbefore the first advance of the cavalry. Again hesays:
“General Cooke was instructed to take position, withcavalry, under the hills in the valley of the Chicka-hominy — there with the aid of artillery to guard ourleft flank. He was especially enjoined to intercept,gather, and hold all stragglers, and under no circum-stances to leave the valley for the purpose of comingupon the hill held by our infantry, or pass in front of ourlino on the left.”
What strange folly of self-contradiction is be-trayed between this order “ to guard our left flank”and the violent condemnation in the first extract,which we have been considering, of the march “toresist an attack of the enemy on our left, . . .”
in a “charge executed in the face of a witheringfire of infantry, and in the midst of our heavy can-nouading as well as that of the enemy.” Could apoet laureate say more ?
Cannon to left of themVolley’d and thundered —
Then they rode back—
Ay, there’s the rub.
When I reported to General Porter before thebattle, I remember that he proposed that I shouldtake post in the narrow open meadow on the ex-treme left. I urged that the flank of the army wasvirtually covered by the Chickahominy; that,moreover, it was covered by three reserve batteriesand 3 29-pounder batteries on the opposite sideof the river; while the position I had taken onthe hill-slope was within view, and also withincavalry striking distance. If I had gone there, Ishould not have been able, when the time came, toface, and, with artillery aid, to stop the enemy inthe flush of his success. To some such objectionswhich I made General Porter evidently yielded,instead of “enjoining” me; forthe cavalry remainedquite near his first station, Adams’s house; and Iwas there with him repeatedly. An order “underno circumstances to leave the valley for the purposeof coming on the hill” would have been to a gen-eral officer not only unprecedented, but insulting.
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How strange, to military ears, would sound anorder “ to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers ”on the extreme front and flank! — and the warningnot to “pass in front of our line on the left!”Such extravagance of action — marching, with noearthly object, between two lines of fire — isseldom thus forestalled! Seriously, this passes thebounds of sanity. But it is emphasized by Hismap, which represents my cavalry as actually mak-ing a flank march between the lines of battle,—Morell’s and Longstreet’s.
It seems necessary to add the statements of eye-witnesses, from different points of view,— men ofwell-known high character,— to corroborate myassertions and my corrections of the misrepresen-tations of the part played by the cavalry and myselfin the battle, as found in “ The Century” article.
Next morning, at Savage’s Station, the Prince deJoinville approached me with both hands extended,saying with empressement, “ I saw you make yourcharge yesterday”; and next day he wrote to theDue d’Aumale [see “ New York Times, ” August13th, 1862]:
. . . “ Those fresh troops rush in good order uponour left, which falters, flies, and passing through theartillery draws on in disorder the troops of our center.The enemy advances rapidly. The fusillade and can-nonade are so violent that the projectiles striking theground raise a permanent cloud of dust. At thatmoment General Cooke charged at the head of hiscalvary; but that movement does not succeed, and hishorsemen on their return only increase the disorder.He makes every effort, aided by all who felt a littlecourage, to stop the panic, hut in vain.”
The Comte de Paris wrote to me, February 2d,1877:
. . . “ I was with De Hart’s battery on the crest ofthe hill when you advanced on our left. . . . Thesacrifice of some of the bravest of the cavalry certainlysaved a part of our artillery I as did, on a larger scale,the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. . . .The main fact is, that with your cavalry you did all thatcavalry could do to stop the rout.”
General W. Merritt wrote me, February 2d,1877:
“ I thought at the time, and subsequent experiencehas convinced me, that your cavalry and the audacityof its conduct at that time, together with the rapidfiring of canister at short range by the battery men-tioned, did much, if not everything, toward preventingthe entire destruction of the Union army at Gaines’sMill. The circumstances were these:
“ The enemy had emerged from a wood, where hisranks were more or less disorganized, into an open field.Instead of finding the way clear before him he was metby a determined charge of cavalry and a heavy artilleryfire. In his mind a new line of fresh troops were beforehim. rt was but natural, at that stage of our militaryexperience, that he should hesitate and halt, to preparefor a new emergency. He did so; and that night thecavalry bivouacked as near the scene of these events asthe enemy did.”
Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Martin wrote to me,March 24th, 1870:
“ It is my opinion that but for the charge of the5th Cavalry on that day, the loss in the command ofGeneral Fitz John Porter would have been immenselygreater than it was; indeed, I believe that the charge,more than any other thing, was instrumental in savingthat part of the army on the north bank of the Chicka-hominy.