REAR-GUARD FIGHTING DURING THE CHANGE OF BASE. 381

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to the James River by that road. General Richardson, with French’s brigade,was instructed to remain, to deceive the enemy as to our movements by firingfield-pieces in the direction of the bridge, and then, after an hour, to march.General Henry M. Naglee was to follow Smith’s division. These instructionswere carried out, and the command arrived at the James about daylight. Thediscovery of this road made the concentration of the troops at Malvern Hilla completed manoeuvre by noon of the 1st of July, and was due to the fertilebrain of General Smith, who ordered the exploration.

The military results of the defense of White Oak Bridge and the battle ofGlendale were: (1) The enemy was repulsed at all points, except in the singlecase of McCall’s division at Glendale, which was overpowered by numbers,after it had captured three of the enemy’s colors; (2) The trains and heavyartillery arrived in safety at the James River (except those wagons which weredestroyed by the bombardment at White Oak Bridge, not exceeding fifty outof more than four thousand), the road along which they passed not havingbeen molested by the enemy; (3) The troops arrived in good time at the river,so that they were all in the positions desired by the commanding general, toawait the attack at Malvern Hill, long before that attack was made.

General Jackson in his report intimates that his whole command, consist-ing of three divisions and D. H. Hill ’s division of five brigades, were all atWhite Oak Bridge on the 30th of June. He says: “ It was soon seen that theenemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening wood on the rightof the road as enabled him to command the crossing. Captain Wooding’s bat-tery was consequently recalled.” General Lee says: “ Jackson having beenunable to force the passage of White Oak Swamp, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were without the expected support ” at the battle of Glendale. It must beevident to any military reader that Jackson ought to have known of theexistence of Brackett’s Ford, only one mile above White Oak Bridge, and oughtto have discovered the weakness of our defense at that point. He had troopsenough to have attacked the ford and the bridge with forces at both pointsexceeding ours at the bridge, and the two attacks, to say the least, would haveembarrassed us exceedingly. Had he made two attacks simultaneously, theresult of the day at Glendale and White Oak Bridge might have been differ-ent. There may be reasons for his inaction in this matter that I do notunderstand, but, as the record now shows, he seems to have been ignorant ofwhat General Lee expected of him, and badly informed about Brackett’s Ford.When he found how strenuous was our defense at the bridge, he should haveturned his attention to Brackett’s Ford also. A force could have been asquietly gathered there as at the bridge; a strong infantry movement at theford would have easily overrun our small force there, placing our right atGlendale, held by Slocum’s division, in great jeopardy, and turning our forceat the bridge by getting between it and Glendale. In fact, it is likely thatwe should have been defeated on that day had General Jackson done what hisgreat reputation seems to make it imperative that he should have done.

A short time after I separated from General McClellan (as mentioned above)at the junction of the Charles City and Quaker roads, I bade farewell to the