382 REAR-GUARD FIGHTING DURING THE CHANGE OF BASE.

Prince de Joinville , who told me that he and his nephews were about to leaveus and return to Europe. He had always been very friendly, and nowexpressed many good wishes for my future. Holding my hand in his, he said,with great earnestness, “ (General, advise General McClellan to concentrate hisarmy at this point, and fight a battle to-day; if he does, he will be in Rich-mond to-morrow.” I was much impressed by his manner and by what he said,and from the purely military point of view the advice may have been good;but it was impracticable for me to adopt the suggestion. General McClellan was then well on his way to the James River, and I had no right to leave mycommand. It was impossible to concentrate the army there that day earlyenough to give battle, and had it been possible to risk a general engagementthere, it would have been contrary to General McClellan ’s views as to hisresponsibility connected with the safety of the army, views which were actuat-ing him in the very movement then taking place. It is likely from what weknow now, that had it been possible to follow the prince’s advice, his militaryforecast might have proved correct. But no one at that hour could have pre-dicted the paralysis of Jackson’s large force in our rear for the whole of thatday, nor General Lee’s ignorance of McClellan ’s intentions. Had a generalengagement taken place, and had we been defeated, the army would havereached the J ames River, it is true, but instead of getting there as it did, withits morale unharmed, and with slight damage to its men and material, itwould have been a disorganized mob, and as an army would have perishedmiserably. General McClellan believed that the destruction of the Army ofthe Potomac at that time would have been ruin to our cause, and his actions,for which he alone is responsible, were guided by that belief and by the con- :viction that at any sacrifice the preservation of that army, at that time , was ’paramount to every other consideration.

I cannot finish without a word as to the conduct of the men. My experi- •ence during the period generally known as “ the Seven Days ” was with theSixth and Second Corps. During the whole time between June 26th and July2d, there was not a night in which the men did not march almost continually,nor a day on which there was not a fight. I never saw a skulker during thewhole time, nor heard one insubordinate word. Some men fell by the way-side, exhausted, and were captured; but their misfortune was due to physicalinability to go on. They had no food but that which was carried in their hav-ersacks, and the hot weather soon rendered that uneatable. Sleep was out ofthe question, and the only rest obtained was while lying down awaiting an ;attack, or sheltering themselves from shot and shell. No murmur was heard;everything was accepted as the work for which they had enlisted. They hadbeen soldiers less than a year, yet their conduct could not have been moresoldierly had they seen ten years of service. No such material for soldiers was iever in the field before, and their behavior in this movement foreshadowedtheir success as veterans at Appomattox.