394

MCCLELLAN’S CHANGE OF BASE AND MALVERN HILL.

the enemy. If one division could effect this much, what might have been donehad the other nine cooperated with it! General Lee says :

“ D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breakingand driving back his first line; but a simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place,he found himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the overwhelming num-bers and the numerous batteries of the enemy. Jackson sent to his support his own division,and that part of Ewell’s which was in reserve ; but owing to the increasing darkness, and theintricacy of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time to render the desired assistance.Hill was therefore compelled to abandon part of the ground that he had gained, after sufferingsevere loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy.”

I never saw anything more grandly heroic than the advance after sunsetof the nine brigades under Magruder’s orders. Unfortunately, they did notmove together, and were beaten in detail. As each brigade emerged from thewoods, from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, tearing great gaps inits ranks; but the heroes reeled on and were shot down by the reserves at theguns, which a few squads reached. Most of them had an open field half amile wide to cross, under the fire of field-artillery in front, and the fire of theheavy ordnance of the gun-boats in their rear. It was not war—it was murder.

Our loss was double that of the Federals at Malvern Hill. Hot only did thefourteen brigades which were engaged suffer, but also the inactive troops andthose brought up as reserves too late to be of any use met many casualtiesfrom the fearful artillery fire which reached all parts of the woods. Hence,more than half the casualties were from field-pieces—an unprecedented thingin warfare. The artillery practice was kept up till nine o’clock at night, andthe darkness added to the glory of the pyrotechnics. It was quite late whenI had posted for the night the last of the reenforcements that had come upwhen the battle was over. A half-hour before, an incident occurred which isthus related by General Trimble :

“ I proposed to General D. H. Hill to ride forward and reconnoiter tlie enemy’s position.We approached within one hundred steps of the enemy’s batteries, and could hear plainlythe ordinary tone of conversation. The guns were then firing on the woods to our left, wherethe last attack had been made, at right angles to that part of the field we were then in. Isuggested to General Hill the advantage of making an attack on this battery, and that itmust be successful, as the enemy would not expect one from our position, and under cover ofthe darkness we could approach them undiscovered. General Hill did not seem inclined tomake the movement.”

The chivalrous Trimble proposed to make the attack with his own brigade,but there were many troops now in the woods, and I thought that the attackwould but expose them to a more intense artillery fire. We saw men goingabout with lanterns, looking up and carrying off the dead and wounded.There were no pickets out, and the rumbling of wheels in the distance seemedto indicate that the retreat had begun. The morning revealed the bareplateau stripped of its terrible batteries. The battle of Malvern Hill was adisaster to the Confederates, and the fourteen brigades that had been sobadly repulsed were much demoralized. But there were six divisons intact,and they could have made a formidable fight on the 2d.

& Toombs’s brigade belonged to Magruder, but had moved to my assistance by my order when we werehard pressed. It was not, therefore, in the final attack made by Magruder.— I). H. H.