MCCLELLAN’S CHANGE OF BASE AND MALVERN HILL.
39S
Possibly owing to the belief that Longstreet and A. P. Hill were making amai’ch between Malvern and Harrison’s Landing, the retreat was the mostdisorderly that took place. Wagons and ambulances were abandoned; knap-sacks, cartridge-boxes, clothing, and rifles by the thousand were thrownaway by the Federals. Colonel James D. Nance, of the 3d South Carolina reg-iment, gathered 925 rifles in fine condition that had been thrown away in theAvheat-field at Shirley, a farm between Malvern and Haxall’s. The fruits ofthe Seven Days’ Fighting were the relief of Richmond , the capture of 9000 pris-oners [including 3000 in hospitals], 52pieces of artillery, and 35,000 stand ofarms, and the destruction or captureof many military stores.
I crossed the Chickahominy with10,000 effective men. Of these 3907were killed or wounded and 48 werereported missing, either captives orfugitives from the field. With the in-fantry and artillery detached, and thelosses before Malvern Hill, I estimatethat my division in that battle was 6500strong, and that the loss was 2000.
Magrader puts his force at between26,000 and 28,000 (I think a high esti-mate), and states his loss as 2900.
Throughout this campaign we at-tacked just when and where the enemywished us to attack. This was owingto our ignorance of the country andlack of reconnoissance of the successive battle-fields. Porter’s weak point at(xaines’s Mill was his right flank. A thorough examination of the groundwould have disclosed that; and had Jackson’s command gone in on theleft of the road running by the McGfehee house, Porter’s whole position wouldhave been turned and the line of retreat cut off. An armed reconnoissanceat Malvern 'would have shown the immense preponderance of the Federalartillery, and that a contest with it must be hopeless. The battle, with allits melancholy results, proved, however, that the Confederate infantry andFederal artillery, side by side on the same field, need fear no foe on earth.
Both commanders had shown great ability. McClellan, if not always greatin the advance, was masterly in retreat, and was unquestionably the greatestof Americans as an organizer of an army. Lee’s plans were perfect; and hadnot his dispositions for a decisive battle at Frayser’s farm miscarried, throughno fault of his own, he would have won a most complete victory. It was notthe least part of his greatness that he did not complain of his disappointment,and that he at no time sought a scape-goat upon which to lay a failure. Asreunited Americans, we have reason to be proud of both commanders.