eferring to the retreat from Malvern Hill,July 2d, General McClellan gives Keyes’scorps the credit of furnishing the entire rear-guard.According to the report of Colonel Averell, of the3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, the rear-guard was madehis command and consisted of his regiment ofHeintzelman’s corps, First Brigade of RegularInfantry, consisting of the 3d, 4th, 12tli, and 14thInfantry, of Porter ’s corps, and the New YorkChasseurs, of Keyes’s corps. The “Official Rec-ords,” Vol. XI., Part II., p. 235, confirm this state-ment. In the same volume, p. 193, will be foundKeyes’s official report, but no mention of Averell.In fact, Averell was the rear-guard to TurkeyBridge and a mile beyond that point, where he
found General Wessells of Keyes’s corps. Theofficial reports of Fitz John Porter , Sykes, andBuchanan all speak of Averell as having coveredthis retreat. The writer was a first lieutenant inthe 12th Infantry, and in command of CompanyI), First Battalion, at Malvern Hill, and remembersdistinctly that the First Brigade of Regulars slepton the field on the night of July 1st in line ofbattle. We were surprised the next morning tofind that the entire army had retreated during thenight, leaving Averell with his small command asa rear-guard to cover the retreat, which was donein the masterly manner stated by General McClel-lan , but by Averell, and not by Keyes.
II.— BY ERASMUS D. KEYES, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.
A few days ago, in Switzerland , my attention wascalled to a communication in the August [1885]number of “The Century,” p. G42, which falsi-fies history. It is under the heading, “ The Rear-Guard after Malvern Hill,” and is signed Henry E.Smith. Mr. Smith asserts that it was GeneralAverell who commanded the rear-guard, and thatto Averell, and not to Keyes, belongs the creditwhich General McClellan gives the latter in hisarticle. Mr. Smith cites authorities for his state-ments, and refers to the “ Official Records of theRebellion,” Vol. XI., Part II., p. 235, and tomy report, p. 193, same volume, in which hesays there is “no mention of Averell.” It is notunreasonable to suppose that Mr. Smith had readGeneral McClellan ’s and my reports, since he refersto them, but it is certain that he discredits both,and that he rejects my claim to approval uncere-moniously [see p. 435]. General McClellan says,in his book, “ Report . . . of the Army of the
Potomac,” etc., p. 273 :
“The greater portion of the transportation of thearmy having been started for Harrison’s Landing duringthe night of the 30th of June and the 1st of July, theorder for the movement of the troops was at once is-sued upon the final repulse of the enemy at MalvernHill. The order prescribed a movement by the left andrear, General Keyes’s corps to cover the manoeuvre. Itwas not carried out in detail as regards the divisionson the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by therear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able tomove out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear-guard between hiscommand and the enemy. Colonel Averell, of the ,3dPennsylvania Cavalry, was intrusted with this delicateduty. He had under his command his own regimentand Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan’s brigade of regularinfantry and one battery. By a judicious use of the re-sources at his command, he deceived the enemy so as tocover the withdrawal of the left wing without being at-tacked, remaining himself on the previous day’s battle-field until about 7 o’clock of the 2d of July. MeantimeGeneral Keyes, having received his orders, commencedvigorous preparations for covering the movement of theentire army, and protecting the trains. It being evidentthat the immense number of wagons and artillery per-taining to the army could not move with celerity alonga single road, General Keyes took advantage of every
accident of the ground to open new avenues, and tofacilitate the movement. He made preparations for ob-structing the roads after the army had passed, so as toprevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually TurkeyBridge, on the main road, and rendering other roadsand approaches temporarily impassable, by felling treesacross them. He kept the trains well closed up, anddirected the march so that the troops could move oneach side of the road, not obstructing the passage, butbeing in good position to repel an attack from anyquarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to usehis own words, ‘ I do not think that more vehicles ormore public property were abandoned on the march fromTurkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same,state of the roads, if the army had been moving towardthe enemy, instead of away from him ’— and when it isunderstood that the carriages and teams belonging tothis army, stretched out in one line, would extend notfar from forty miles, the energy and caution necessaryfor their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemyvastly superior in numbers, will be appreciated. . . .Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for theskill and energy which characterized his performanceof the important and delicate duties intrusted to hischarge.’’
The above extract defines General Averell’s du-ties on the field of Malvern, and gives him credit,and it is equally distinct in reference to me, butGeneral McClellan ’s article is vague in its expres-sions regarding the same subjects. As Mr. Smith’sarticle is historically erroneous, I trust you willconsider it just to give place to this explanation,and to the following short account of “ The Rear-Guard after Malvern Hill.”
After the battle of Malvern Hill, which wasfought on the 1st of July, 1862, the army retiredto Harrison’s Landing. Late in the evening ofthat day I received orders from Adjutant-GeneralSeth Williams to command the rear-guard. I spentnearly the whole night making preparatory ar-rangements; dispatched a party to destroy TurkeyBridge ; selected twenty-five expert axe-men underCaptain Clarke, 8th Illinois Cavalry, with ordersto chop nearly through all the large trees that linedthe road below the bridge. All my orders were wellexecuted, and within fifteen minutes after the tailof the column passed, the bridge was destroyedwithout blowing up, and the road blocked beyond
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