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the possibility of passage by wheels and cavalry,and made difficult for infantry for several horns.
The force composing the rear-guard consistedof Peck’s division of infantry and four batteriesof artillery of my own corps, Gregg’s 8th Penn-sylvania Cavalry and Farnsworth’s 8th IllinoisCavalry. Averell’s regiment of cavalry was alsodesignated in a dispatcli sent me by Adjutant-General Williams, and he may have taken partbelow the bridge, but I do not remember to haveseen him during the day.
The danger to the trains arose from the fact thatthe narrow country roads were insufficient innumber, and their composition was mostly clay,which was soon converted into mud by the torrentsof rain which fell nearly the whole day, and fromthe liability to attack on the flank. The mainroad was skirted with woods on the left the entiredistance, which is about seven miles from TurkeyBridge to Harrison’s Landing. The opposite sideof the main road was open, and the columns oftroops could move parallel with the wagons.When General W. F. Smith came along at the headof his division, I was opposite an opening in thewoods at the highest point of the road. Smith ex-claimed to me : “ Plere’s a good place for a battle!”“Would you like to have a fight?” said I. “Yes;just here, and now ! ” While the columns of troopswere moving alongside the trains I felt no appre-hension, but after they had all passed there stillremained in rear not less than five hundred wagonsstruggling in the mud, and it was not above ten min-utes after the last vehicle had entered the largefield bordering the intended camp when the enemyappeared and commenced a cannonade upon us.Fortunately I had in position Miller’s and Mc-
Carthy’s batteries, and they replied with such effectthat the attack was discontinued.
The anxiety at headquarters was such that I wasauthorized, in case of necessity, to cut the tracesand drive the animals forward without their loads.Nothing of that kind was done, and we saved allthe wagons except a small number that broke downand were as necessarily abandoned as a vessel ina convoy would be after it had sunk in theocean.
About the middle of the day I received a notefrom headquarters at Harrison’s Landing, of whichthe following is a copy :
“ General : I have ordered back to your assistance allthe cavalry that can be raised here. It is of the utmostimportance that we should save all our artillery, and asmany of our wagons as possible; and the commandinggeneral feels the utmost confidence that you will do allthat can be done to accomplish this. Permit me to saythat if you bring in everything you will accomplish amost signal and meritorious exploit, which the com-manding general will not fail to represent in its properlight to the Department. Very respectfully,
E. B. Marcy,
July 2d. “ Chief of Staff.
“ Brigadier-General Keyes.”
General McClellan came out half a mile and metme. I was engaged sending forward sheaves ofwheat to fill the ruts in the road near camp,which were so deep that in spite of all effortsto fill them, about 1200 wagons were parkedfor the night under guard outside. The generalappeared well satisfied with what had been doneby the rear-guard, and after all the proofs citedabove, it is scarcely probable that he made a mis-take in the name of its commander.
THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN .
BY RICHARD B. IRWIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V.
riVHE views entertained by General McClellan as-L to the manner and extent to which his plansand operations on the Peninsula were interferedwith or supported by the Government having beenfully set forth by him in these pages, it is nowproper to show, as far as this can be done from theofficial reports, how the case must have presenteditself to the President and the Secretary of War.
Appointed on the 25th of July, 1861, immedi-ately after Bull Run, to the command of theshattered and reduced forces then gathered aboutWashington, at one time not exceeding 42,000 alltold, General McClellan was rapidly reenforced,until on the loth of March, 1862, he had under hiscommand within the division or department of thePotomac 203,213 men present for duty. Thefield-artillery was increased from 30 guns to 520 ;to these had been added a siege train of nearly100 heavy guns. From these materials he organ-ized the Army of the Potomac.
In the last days of October General McClellan presented to the Secretary of War a written state-ment of his views as to the conduct of operations,in which, after representing the Confederate forcesin his front at not less than 150,000, his own
movable force as 76,285, with 228 guns, and theforce required for active operations as 150,000men, with 400 guns, he recommended that alloperations in other quarters be confined to thedefensive, and that all surplus troops be sent toreenforce the Army of the Potomac.
“A vigorous employment of these means fhe pro-ceeds] will, in my opinion, enable the Army of thePotomac to assume successfully this season the offen-sive operations which, ever since entering upon thecommand, it has been my anxious desire aud diligenteffort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance shouldnot be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possi-ble to avoid it.
“ Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy inaction are indispensable. The entire military fieldshould he grasped as a whole, and not in detachedparts. One plan should be agreed upon and pursued; asingle will should direct and carry out these plans. Thegreat oh,feet to be accomplished, the crushing defeat ofthe rebel army (now) at Manassas , should never for oneinstant be lost sight of, hut all the intellect aud meansand men of the Government poured upon that point.”
On the 1st of November, 1861, the President,“ with the concurrence of the entire Cabinet,”designated General McClellan “ to command thewhole army” of the United States . No trust