not hold me responsible for the result. I feel too ear-nestly to-night. I liave seen too many dead and woundedcomrades to feel otherwise than that the Governmenthas not sustained this army. . . . If I save this armynow, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you orto any other persons in Washington. You have doneyour best to sacrifice this army,
On reaching the James River, General McClellan reported that he had saved his army, hut it was com-pletely exhausted and would require reenforce-ments to the extent of 50,000 men. On the 3d ofJuly, lie wrote more fully from Harrison’s Landing,then saying that “ reenforeements should be sentto me rather much over, than much less, than100,000 men.” He referred to his memorandumof the 20tli of August, 1861. That memorandumcalled for 273,000 men. General Marcy, hischief-of-staff, who bore this dispatch to Washing-ton, telegraphed back:
“I have seen the President and Secretary of War.10,000 men from Hunter, 10,000 from Burnside, and 11,000from here have been ordered to reenforce you as soon aspossible. Halleck [who had been originally called onfor 25,000 men which he had reported he could not spare]has been urged by the President to send you at once10,000 men from Corinth. The President and Secretaryspeak very kindly of you and find no fault.”
The dispatches of the President and Secretarybreathe the same spirit.
“Allow me to reason with you a moment [wrote Mr.Lincoln on the 2d of July, adding that he had not fiftythousand men who could be sent promptly]. If, inyour frequent mention of responsibility, you have theimpression that I blame you for not doing more thanyou can, please be relieved of such impression. I onlybeg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilitiesof me. If you think you are not strong enough to takeRichmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now.Save the army, material and personal, and I willstrengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can.The governors of 18 States offer me a new levy of 300,000,which I accept.”
On the 5th, Mr. Stanton wrote that he had nomi-nated all the corps commanders for promotion.
“ The gallantry of every officer and man in your noblearmy shall be suitably acknowledged. General Marcywill take you cheering news. Be assured that you shallhave the support of this Department and the Governmentas cordially and faithfully as ever was renderedby man toman, and if we should ever live to see each other face toface, you will be satisfied that you have never had fromme anything but the most confiding integrity.”
The next day Mr. Stanton followed this by apersonal letter, couched in still warmer terms.
“No man [he wrote] had ever a truer friend than Ihave been to you, and shall continue to he. You areseldom absent from my thoughts, and I am ready tomake any sacrifice to aid you. Time allows me to sayno more than that I pray Almighty God to deliver youand your army from all perils and lead you on to victory.”
General McClellan ’s reply was long, cold, andformal. He reviewed their past relations, andalluded to the Secretary’s official conduct towardhim as “ marked by repeated acts done in suchmanner as to be deeply offensive to my feelings,and calculated to affect me injuriously in publicestimation.”
“ After commencing the present campaign [he con-tinued], your concurrence in the withholding of a largeportion of my force, so essential to the success of myplans, led me to believe that your mind was warped by abitter personal prejudice against me. Your letter com-pels me to believe that I have been mistaken in regardto your real feelings and opinions, and that your con-duct, so unaccountable to my own fallible judgment,must have proceeded from views and motives which Idid not understand.”
The campaign had failed. The President visitedHarrison’s Landing to see for himself what was tobe done next. Then General McClellan handedhim his well-known letter “upon a civil and mili-tary policy covering the whole ground of our na-tional trouble.” He called Mr. Stanton’s attentionto this letter, in the reply we have just cited, andtold him that for no other policy would our armiescontinue to fight. This must have been the laststraw. J On one point, however, he was in accordwith the President. He wound up by recommend-ing the appointment of a commander-in-chief of thearmy who should possess the President’s confidence.On the 11th General Halleck was appointed.
On the 26th General Halleck arrived at GeneralMcClellan’s camp. He reports that McClellan “expressed the opinion that with 30,000 reen-forcements he could attack Richmond, with 1 a goodchance of success.’ I replied that I was authorizedby the President to promise only 20,000, and thatif he could not take Richmond with that numberwe must devise some plan for withdrawing histroops from their present position to some pointwhere they could unite with those of General Popewithout exposing Washington. . . . He . . .
the next morning informed me he would attackRichmond with the reenforeements promised. Hewould not say that he thought the probabilitiesof success were in his favor, but that there was ‘ achance,’ and he was ‘ willing to try it.’
“ With regard to the force of the enemy he ex-pressed the opinion that it was not less than200 , 000 .”
The orders for the removal followed. “Therewas, to my mind,” General Halleck says, “no al-ternative.” “I have taken the responsibility ofdoing so and am to risk my reputation on it.”
Upon whatever side, if upon either, of thesemany-sided controversies, history shall at last ad-judge the right to be, upon whatever shoulders andin whatever degree the burden of blame shall finallyrest, certain it is that no fair account of theseoperations can ever be written without taking noteof these delays, whereby the initiative was trans-ferred to the adversary; of these disasters, theseunproductive victories, this ceaseless flow of tel-egrams, surcharged with the varying words ofcontroversy, criticism, objection, reproach; and ofthe inevitable effect of all these causes combined,in weakening the confidence of the President andin undermining his authority and influence, which,however, to the last were exerted to uphold thegeneral of his first choice at the head of his great-est army.
•fc Original not italicized. These words are omitted in the dispatch as printed in the report of tile Committee onthe Conduct of the War.—R. B. I. j Confirmed by Chase and Welles.— R. B. I.