THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
437
ordered to the Peninsula, in response to GeneralMcClellan ’s earnest renewal of his request.
General McClellan estimates his force beforeFranklin’s arrival at 85,000, apparently meaningfighting men, since the returns show 105,235 pres-ent for duty on the 13th of April. On the 30th,including Franklin, this number was increased to112,392. General McClellan also estimated theConfederate forces at “ probably not less than100,000 men, and possibly more,”j> “probablygreater a good deal than my own.” \ We nowknow that their total effective strength on the30th of April was 55,633 of all arms. When theArmy of the Potomac halted before the lines ofthe Warwick, Magruder’s whole force was but11,000. General McClellan estimated it at only15,000, and his own, confronting it, at the sameperiod, at 53,000.
The plan of a rapid movement up the Peninsulahaving resolved itself into an endeavor to takeYorktown by regular approaches in front, leavingits rear necessarily open, General McClellan thusdescribes the result:
“Our batteries would have been ready to open on themorning of the 6th of May at latest; but on the morn-ing of the 4th it was discovered that the enemy hadalready been compelled to evacuate his position duringthe night.”
The effect of these delays on Mr. Lincoln’s mindis curiously indicated by his telegram of May 1st:
“Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarmsme, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination.Is anything to be done ? ”
Then followed the confused and unduly dis-couraging battle of Williamsburg ; the attempt tocut off the Confederate retreat by a landing at WestPoint came to nothing; and on the 20th of May,the Army of the Potomac, having moved forward52 miles in 10 days, reached the banks of theChickahominy. There it lay, astride of that slug-gish stream, imbedded in its pestilential swamps,for thirty-nine days.
On the 31st of May, at Fair Oaks, Johnstonfailed, though narrowly missing success, in a well-meant attempt to crush McClellan ’s forces on theright bank of the swollen stream before theycould be reenforced. On the 1st of June theConfederate forces were driven back in disorderupon the defenses of Richmond , but the damagesuffered by the Union forces on the first day beingover-estimated, and their success on the secondday insufficiently appreciated, or inadequatelyrepresented, and no apparent advantage beingtaken of them, the general effect was to add to thediscouragement already prevailing.
Reenforcements continuing to be urgently calledfor, Fort Monroe, with its dependencies, reporting9277 for duty, was placed under General McClel-lan ’s orders; McCall’s division, with 22 guns, wasdetached from McDowell, and arrived by water9514 strong on the 12th and 13th of June ; whileMcDowell, with the rest of his command, wasordered to march to join McClellan by land: thismovement was, however, promptly brought to
i Telegram to Stanton, April 7th, 1862.
naught by Jackson’s sudden incursion againstBanks in the Shenandoah.
Meanwhile, the flow of telegrams indicated anever-increasing tension, the Executive urging toaction, the General promising to act soon, notacting, yet criticising and objecting to the Presi-dent’s orders to him and to others. On the 25th ofMay the President said : “ I think the time is nearwhen you must either attack Richmond or give upthe job and come to the defense of Washington.”McClellan replied: “ The time is very near when Ishall attack Richmond .” Then, June 10th, he says;“I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward totake Richmond the moment that McCall reacheshere and the ground will admit the passage ofartillery.” June 14th: “If I cannot control allhis (McDowell’s) troops I want none of them, butwould prefer to fight the battle with what I have,and let others be responsible for the results.” Onthe 18th: “After to-morrow we shall fight the rebelarmy as soon as Providence will permit. We shallawait only a favorable condition of the earth andsky and the completion of some necessary prelimi-naries.” While appealing to the President whensome of his telegrams to the Secretary remainedfor a time unanswered, General McClellan allowedMr. Stanton’s cordial assurances of friendship andsupport to pass unnoticed.
At last, on the 25th, General McClellan advancedhis picket lines on the left to within four miles ofRichmond , and was apparently preparing for a fur-ther movement, though none was ordered, and thenext day, as at Manassas and Yorktown and FairOaks, his adversary once more took the initiativeout of his hands. Jackson had come from theValley.
As soon as this was known, on the evening ofthe 25th, General McClellan reported it to Mr.Stanton, added that he thought Jackson would at-tack his right and rear, that the Confederate forcewas stated at 200,000, that he regretted his greatinferiority in numbers, but was in no way respon-sible for it, and concluded :
“ I will do all that a general can do with the splendidarmy I have the honor to command, and it it. is de-stroyed by overwhelming numbers can at least die withit and share its fate. But it the result of the action,which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a shorttime, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrownon my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.”
The battle of Gaines’s Mill followed, where, onthe 27th, one-fifth of the Union forces contendedagainst the whole Confederate army, save Magru-der’s corps and Huger’s division ; then the retreat,or “ change of base,” to the James, crowned by thesplendid yet unfruitful victory of Malvern ; then amonth of inaction and discussion at Harrison’sLanding.
At 1 2 : 20 A. M., on the 28th of June, GeneralMcClellan sent a long telegram, of which thesesentences strike the key-note :
“ Our men [at Gaines’s Mill] did all that men could do. . . but they were overwhelmed by vastly superiornumbers, even after I brought my last reserves intoaction. . . . I have lost this battle because my forceis too small. . . . The Government must not and can-
\ Telegram to Stanton, May 5th, 1862.