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therefore be impossible to send him any of my troops without putting it in thepower of the enemy to exchange Richmond for Washington ; that to them theloss of Richmond would be comparatively a small loss, while to us the loss ofWashington would be almost a fatal blow. I was so impressed with theseopinions that I several times urged them upon the attention of the Presidentand the Secretary of War.
The soundness of these views can be easily tested by subsequent facts. Theenemy actually did choose between the danger of losing Richmond and thechance of capturing Washington. J) Stonewall Jackson ’s corps was detachedfrom Lee’s army confronting McClellan at Harrison’s Landing early in July,and on the 19th of that month was concentrated at Gordonsville in my front;while Stuart’s cavalry division, detached from Lee’s army about the sametime, was at or near Fredericksburg watching our movements from that direc-tion. On the 13th of August Longstreet’s whole corps was dispatched to joinJackson at Gordonsville, to which place he had fallen back from Cedar Moun-tain, and the head of Longstreet’s corps had joined Jackson at that place onAugust 15th. These forces were commanded by Lee in person, who was atGordonsville on that day. The first troops of the Army of the Potomac whichleft Harrison’s Landing moved out from that place on August 14th, \ at whichdate there was nothing of Lee’s army, except D. H. Hill ’s corps, left in front
j) General Lee says in his report dated April18th, 1863:
“To meet tlie advance of the latter [Pope 1 • • • Gen-eral Jackson , with his own and Ewell’s divisions, wasordered to proceed toward Gordonsville on July I3tli.Upon reaching that vicinity he ascertained that theforce under General Pope was superior to his own, butthe uncertainty that then surrounded the designs ofMcClellan rendered it inexpedient to reenforce himfrom the army at Richmond. . . . Assistance waspromised should the progress of General Pope put it inour power to strike an effectual blow without withdraw-ing the troops too long from the defense of the capital.The army at Westover [Harrison’s Landing], continuingto manifest no intention of resuming active operations,and General Pope’s advance having reached the Rapi-dan, General A. P. Hill , with his division, was orderedon July 27th to join General Jackson . At the same time,in order to keep McClellan stationary, or, if possible, tocause him to withdraw, General D. H. Hill , command-ing south of James River, was directed to threaten hiscommunications.”
And in his report, dated June 8th, 1863 :
“The victory at Cedar Run [August 9tli] effectuallychecked the progress of the enemy for the time, but itsoon became apparent that bis army was being largelyincreased. The corps of Major-General Burnside fromNorth Carolina , which had reached Fredericksburg[August 4th and 5th], was reported to have moved up theRappahannock a few days after the battle, to unite withGeneral Pope, and a part of General McClellan ’s armywas believed to have left Westover for the same purpose.It therefore seemed that active operations on the Jameswere no longer contemplated, and that the most effectualway to relieve Richmond from any danger of attackfrom that quarter would be to reenforce General Jack-son and advance upon General Pope.” Editors.
\ On the 30th of July General Halleck orderedGeneral McClellan to send away his sick as rapidlyas possible. On the 3d of August General Hallecktelegraphed: “It is determined to withdraw your
army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. Youwill take immediate measures to effect this. . . .Your material and transportation should be re-moved first.” General McClellan protested againstthe movement, as did Generals Dix, Burnside, andSumner. General Halleck replied to General Mc-Clellan that he saw no alternative. “There isno change of plans,” “I , . . have taken the
responsibility . . . and am to risk my reputa-
tion on it.”
The movement of the sick began at once.Between the 1st of August, when the order wasreceived, and the 16th, when the evacuation ofHarrison’s Landing was completed, 14,159 weresent away, many of them necessarily to the North .The first troops arrived at Aquia within sevendays, and the last of the infantry within 26 days,after the receipt of the order.
(The original movement of the Army of the Po-tomac, from Alexandria to Fort Monroe, had taken37 days, and Mr. Tucker, who had superintendedits transport, said of it: “I confidently submitthat for economy and celerity this expeditionis without a parallel on record.”)
In the terms of General Halleck’s order of Au-gust 3d, there were to be transported first the14,159 sick; next all the material of the army,and the transportation, embracing 3100 wagons,350 ambulances, 13,000 horses and mules; then89,407 officers and men, 360 guns, and 13,000artillery and cavalry horses, together with the bag-gage and stores in use ; but in order to hasten themovement this routine was not rigidly observed,and the movement of Peck’s division (ordered tomove last) of 7581 men and 10 guns was counter-manded by General Halleck.— Editors.