THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

455

RETREAT OF THE UNION TROOPS ACROSS TIIE RAPPAHANNOCK AT RAPPAHAN-NOCK STATION. AFTER A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

of McClellan or nearto him. Hill’s corpscould have opposedbut little effectiveresistance to the ad-vance of the Armyof the Potomac uponRichmond.

It seems clear, then,that the views ex-pressed to the Presi-dent and Secretaryof War, as heretoforeset forth, were sound,and that the enemyhad left McClellan to work his will on Richmond, while they pushed forwardagainst the small army under my command and to the capture of Washing-ton. This movement of Lee was, in my opinion, in accordance with truemilitary principle, and was the natural result of McClellan ’s retreat to Har-rison’s Landing, which completely separated the Army of the Potomac fromthe Army of Virginia and left the entire force of the enemy interposedbetween them.

The retreat of General McClellan to Harrison’s Landing was, however, con-tinued to the end. During these six days of anxiety and apprehension Mr.Lincoln spent much of his time in the office of the Secretary of War, most ofthat time reclining on a sofa or lounge. The Secretary of War was alwayswith him, and from time to time his Cabinet officers came in. Mr. Lincolnhimself appeared much depressed and wearied, though occasionally, while wait-ing for telegrams, he would break into some humorous remark, which seemedrather a protest against his despondent manner than any genuine expressionof enjoyment. He spoke no unkind word of any one, and appeared to beanxious himself to bear all the burden of the situation; and when the finalresult was reported he rose with a sorrowful face and left the War Department .

A day or two after General McClellan reached the James River I wascalled before the President and his Cabinet to consult upon means and move-ments to relieve him. I do not know that it would be proper even at this dayfor me to state what occurred or what was said during this consultation,except so far as I was myself directly concerned. General McClellan wascalling for reenforcements, and stating that “ much over rather than underone hundred thousand men ” were necessary before he could resume opera-tions against Richmond. I had not under my command one-half that force.

I stated to the President and Cabinet that I stood ready to undertake anymovement, however hazardous, to relieve the Army of the Potomac. Somesuggestions which seemed to me impracticable were made, and much was saidwhich under the circumstances will not bear repetition.

I stated that only on one condition would I be willing to involve the army