THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN, OR BOONSBORO’.

569

About 3:30 p. m. the advance of Longstreet’s command arrived and reportedto me — one brigade under Colonel G. T. Anderson and one under GeneralDrayton. They were attached to Ripley’s left, and a forward movement wasordered. In half an hour or more I received a note from Ripley saying thathe was progressing finely; so he was, to the rear of the mountain on the westside. Before he returned the fighting was over, and his brigade did not firea shot that day. A The Federal commander intrusted to General Burnside themanagement of the fight, but under his own eyes; Burnside ordered a generaladvance on both sides of the pike. The First Corps, under Hooker, was toattack on the north side of the Rational road, while the Ninth Corps, underReno , was to move forward, as before, on the south side. Hooker’s corpsconsisted of 3 divisions, 10 brigades, or 42 regiments, with 10 batteries ofartillery and a battalion of cavalry. General Meade, a division commander ,had under him the brigades of Seymour, Magilton, and Gallagher, containing13 regiments with 4 batteries attached. General Hatch, division com-mander, had under him the brigades of Doubleday, Phelps, Patrick, andGibbon —17 regiments and 4 batteries. General Ricketts, division com-mander, had under him the brigades of Duryea, Christian, and Hartsuff—12regiments and 2 batteries. From the nature of the ground, none of the artil-lery of Hooker’s corps could be used, except that which went directly up thepike with Gibbon’s brigade and one battery (Cooper’s) on the enemy’s right.

The hour for the general advance is not specified in the reports. Some ofthe Federal officers, as we have seen, speak of the general advance at 5 p. m.General Sturgis says that he became engaged on the south side of the pike at3:30 p. m. General Meade , on the north side, says that he moved toward theright at 2 p. m., 5, while General Ricketts, who took part in the same movement,says that he did not arrive at the foot of the mountain until 5 p. m. If GeneralMeade was not mistaken as to the time of his starting, he must have been longdelayed in the thick woods through which the first part of his march was made.

Here is probably the best place to explain the extraordinary caution of theFederals, which seemed so mysterious to us on that 14th of September. An

In “ The Century” magazine for December,1886, page 308, was printed a letter from WilliamL». De Rosset, Colonel of the 3d North Carolina regiment, in which, after stating that General Hilldisclaims any intention of reflecting on Ripley’sbrigade in this statement, the writer says:

“The facts are these: He [General Hill] correctlystates Ripley’s manoeuvres at Boonsboro’ until wereached a position at the foot of the mountain,— on thewest side,— when General Ripley said to me that wewere entirely cut off from the rest of the army, exceptG. B. Anderson’s brigade, which was on our right, andthat lie assumed the command of the two brigades,directing me to take command of the three regiments(Colonel Doles, with his 4th Georgia, having been de-tached and sent to a position on the north of the pike),and that he would remain near me, directing me at thesame time to advance slowly up the mountain with astrong line of skirmishers in front. Upon reaching thesummit, after toiling through the dense undergrowth oflaurel, Captain Thurston, in command of the skirmishline, reported troops in his front, a few minutes laterconfirming his first impression that they were G. B.

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Anderson’s brigade, presenting their flank and advanc-ing toward his left. This was promptly reportedthrough my adjutant to General Ripley, who directedme to withdraw to my original position, which havingbeen accomplished, I was directed to hold my thenposition until further orders. After nightfall I movedforward, changing front to the left, a short distance, tothe support of General Drayton, remaining there ‘ with-out drawing trigger ’ until we took up the line of marchfor Sharpsburg, about 10 to 12 at night. While, there-fore, we accomplished nothing tangible, we were in posi-tion to do any duty for which we might be called.”

Editors.

& This is the hour at which General Meade sayshe received the order to move to the front, fromthe point where his division was halted beyondMiddletown, at Catoctin creek. Meade turned offto the right, followed the old Hagerstown road toMount Tabor Church, and then formed line at thefoot of the mountain for the climb. Cooper’s bat-tery opened fire at 3:30. Hatch followed Meade ,and Ricketts moved last, —Editors,