570

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN, OR B00NSB0R0’.

order of General Lee, made while at Frederick , directing Jackson to captureHarper’s Ferry , and Longstreet and myself to go to Boonsboro’, had fallen intothe hands of the Federals, and had been carried to General McClellan . Thisorder (known at the South as the Lost Dispatch) was addressed to me, hut Iproved twenty years ago that it could not have been lost through my neglector carelessness. J The Federal commander gained two facts from the order,one of which was needless and the other misleading. He learned that Jack-son had gone to Harper’s Ferry — a truth that he must have learned from hisown scouts and spies and the roar of artillery in his own ears: the cannon-ading could be distinctly heard at Frederick , and it told that some one wasbeleaguering Harper’s Ferry . The misleading report was that Longstreetwas at Boonsboro’. % The map of the battle-field of South Mountain,prepared in 1872, ten years after the fight, by the United States Bureau ofEngineers, represents ten regiments and one battalion under Longstreet at thefoot of the mountain on the morning of the 14th of September, 1862. ButLongstreet was then an ordinary day’s march from that point. In fact, afterthe removal of Colquitt’s brigade, about 7 a. m., there was not a Southern sol-dier at the foot of the mountain until 3 p. m., when Captain Park of the 12thAlabama Regiment was sent there with forty men. General McClellan in hisreport says: “ It is believed that the force opposed to us at Turner’s Gap con-sisted of D. H. Hill’s cox-ps (fifteen thousand) and a part if not the whole ofLongstreet’s, and perhaps a portion of Jackson’s,— probably thirty thousandin all.” (“Official Records,” Volume XIX., Pt. I., p. 53.) The mistake of theFederal commander in regard to General Longstreet was natural, since hewas misled by the Lost Dispatch. But it seems strange that the UnitedStates Engineers should repeat the blunder, with the light of history thrownfor ten years upon all the incidents of the battle. It was incomprehensible tous of the losing side that the men who charged us so boldly and repulsed ourattacks so successfully should let slip the fruits of victory and fall back asthough defeated. The prisoners taken were from my division, but the victorsseemed to think that Longstreet’s men lay hidden somewhere in the depthsof those mysterious forests. Thus it was that a thin line of men extending formiles along the crest of the mountain could afford protection for so many hoursto Lee ’s trains and artillery and could delay the Federal advance until Long-street’s command did come up, and, joining with mine, saved the two wings ofthe army from being cut in two. But for the mistake about the position of ourforces, McClellan could have captured Lee ’s trains and artillery and interposedbetween Jackson and Longstreet before noon on that 14th of September. Thelosing of the dispatch was the saving of Lee ’s army.

j In a letter to the editors, dated February 24th,1888, General Hill says: “I went into Maryland under Jackson’s command. I was under his com-mand when Lee ’s order was issued. It was properthat I should receive that order through Jacksonand not through Lee . I have now before me theorder received from Jackson. . . . My adju-

tant-general made affidavit, twenty years ago, thatno order was received at our office from Gen-

eral Lee. But an order from Lee ’s office, directedto me, was lost and fell into McClellan ’s hands.Did the courier lose it ? Did Lee ’s own staff-officers lose it ? I do not know.” See also pp.603 and 664.— Editors.

Special Orders No. 191,” which was the“lost order,” sent Longstreet to Boonsboro’. Itwas afterward modified by General Lee so as toplace Longstreet at Hagerstown.— Editors.