THE BATTLE OF CORINTH.

r m

c?sPfti

/ ' ;A ■!['’

RAILWAY STATION AND TISHOMINGO HOTEL, CORINTH . FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

On the 28th I telegraphed to General Grant at Columbus, Kentucky , confir-mation of my report of Price ’s movement to Ripley, adding that I should moveStanley’s division to Rienzi, and thence to Kossuth, unless he had otherviews. Two days later I again telegraphed to General Grant that there wereno signs of the enemy at Hatchie Crossing, and that my reason for proposingto put Stanley at or near Kossuth was that he would cover nearly all theHatchie Crossing, as far as Pocahontas, except against heavy forces, and thatHamilton would then move at least one brigade, from Rienzi. I asked that asharp lookout be kept in the direction of Bolivar. October 1st, I telegraphedGeneral Grant that we were satisfied there was no enemy for three milesbeyond Hatchie; also, that prisoners reported that General John C. Breckin-ridge, of Yan Dorn’s command, had gone to Kentucky with three Kentucky regiments, leaving his division under the command of General Albert Rust.The combined forces under Yan Dorn and Price were reported to be encampedon the Pocahontas road, and to number forty thousand. J

Amid the numberless rumors and uncertainties besetting me at Corinth during the five days between September 26th, when I assumed command, andOctober 1st, how gratifying would have been the knowledge of the followingfacts, taken from Yan Dorn’s report, dated Holly Springs, October 20th, 1862:

“ Surveying the whole field of operations before me, . . . the conclusion forced itself

irresistibly upon my mind that the taking of Corinth was a condition precedent to the accom-plishment of anything of importance in west Tennessee . To take Memphis would be to destroyan immense amount of property without any adequate military advantage, even admitting thatit could be held without heavy guns against the enemy’s gun and mortar boats. The line offortifications around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to takethe place by quick assault. ... It was clear to my mind that if a successful attack couldbe made upon Corinth from the west and north-west, the forces there driven back on the Ten-

f In fact about 22,000, as stated by Van Dom in the report quoted. And see “With Price East ofthe Mississippi, ” by Colonel Thomas L. Snead, p. 726.—Editors.