THE BATTLE OF CORINTH.

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nessee and out off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of theexchanged prisoners of war, west Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and communica-tion with General Bragg effected through middle Tennessee . . . .

“ I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns atRipley showed my strength to be about 22,000 men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about 15,000,with about 8000 additional men at outposts, from 12 to 15 miles distant. I might surprise himand carry the place before these troops could be brought in. . . . It was necessary that

this blow should be sudden and decisive. . . .

“ The troops were in fine spirits, and the whole Army of West Tennessee seemed eager toemulate the armies of the Potomac and of Kentucky . No army ever marched to battle withprouder steps, more hopeful countenances, or with more courage than marched the Army ofWest Tennessee out of Ripley on the morning of September 29th, on its way to Corinth .”

But of all this I knew nothing. With only McKean’s and Davies’s divis-ions, not ten thousand men, at Corinth on the 26th of September, by October1st I had gradually drawn in pretty close Stanley’s and Hamilton’s divisions.They had been kept watching to the south and south-west of Corinth .

Our forces when concentrated would make about 16,000 effective infantryand artillery for defense, with 2500 cavalry for outposts and reconnoitering.

On October 2d, while Van Dorn was at Pocahontas, Gteneral Hurlbut tele-graphed the information, from an intelligent Union man of Grand Junction ,that “Price, Van Dorn, and Villepigue were at Pocahontas, and the talk wasthat they would attack Bolivar.” Evidence arriving thick and fast showedthat the enemy was moving, but whether on Corinth or Bolivar, or whether,passing between, they would strike and capture Jackson, was not yet clear toany of us. I knew that the enemy intended a strong movement, and I thoughtthey must have the impression that our defensive works at Corinth would bepretty formidable. I doubted if they would venture to bring their forceagainst our command behind defensive works. I therefore said: The enemymay threaten us and strike across our line entirely, get on the road betweenus and Jackson and advance upon that place, the capture of which wouldcompel us to get out of our lines; or he may come in by the road from Tupelo so as to interpose his force between us and Danville. But all the time Iinclined to the belief that it would not be for his interest to do that. Ithought that perhaps he would cross the Memphis and Charleston road and,going over to the Mobile and Ohio road, force us to move out and fight himin the open country.

October 2d, I sent out a cavalry detachment to reconnoiter in the directionof Pocahontas. They found the enemy’s infantry coming close in, and thatnight some of our detachment were surprised, and their horses and a few ofthe men were captured. Those that escaped reported the enemy there inforce. This was still consistent with the theory that the enemy wished tocross the Memphis and Charleston road, go north of us, strike the Mobile andOhio road and manoeuvre us out of our position.

To be prepared for whatever they might do, I sent Oliver’s brigade ofMcKean’s division out to Chewalla, ten miles north-west in Tennessee . Onthe morning of the 3d the enemy’s advance came to Chewalla, and Oliver’sbrigade fell back fighting. I sent orders to the brigade commander to make