LEE’S INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.

245

a terrible calamity. Although we felt the immediate loss of Jackson’s services,Was supposed he would rally and get well. He lingered for several days,° lie Jay reported better and the next worse, until at last he was taken from118 to the shades of Paradise. The shock was a very severe one to men andofficers, but the full extent of our loss was not felt until the remains of theeioved general had been sent home. The dark clouds of the future thenDe gan to lower above the Confederates.

Ceneral Lee at that time was confronted by two problems: one, the finding^ successor for Jackson, another, the future movements of the Army of. 0l 'thern Virginia . After considering the matter fully he decided to reorgan-his army, making three corps instead of two. I was in command of the

lrs t Corps, aud he seemed anxious to have a second and third corps under

P

the command of Virginians . To do so was to overlook the claims of other^ eile rals who had been active and very efficient in the service. He selectedeneral Ewell to command the Second, and General A. P. Hill for the Third0r Ps. General Ewell was entitled to command by reason of his rank,^tyices, and ability. Next in rank was a North Carolinian , General D. H.

Sill,

and next a Georgian, General Lafayette McLaws , against whom was

le objection that they were not Virginians . J

Sr reorganizing his army, General Lee impaired to some extent the moralehis troops, but the First Corps, dismembered as it was, still considered

hself

with fair opportunities, invincible, and was ready for any move war-

la nted by good judgment.

SCrhe General Lee was reorganizing his army he was also arranging the

hew

campaign. Grant had laid siege to Vicksburg , and Johnston was concen-

ts

la, tiirg at Jackson to drive him away. Rosecrans was in Tennessee and Bragg^as in front 0 f him. The force Johnston was concentrating at Jackson gaveto hope that he would have sufficient strength to make any impressionll p°n Grant, and even if he could, Grant was in position to reenforce rapidlya td could supply his army with greater facility. Vicksburg was doomed^tlegg we CO nld offer relief by strategic move. I proposed to send a forcer°Ugh east Tennessee to join Bragg and also to have Johnston sent to join

him,

p, g. was ^he SU p er i or of Generalguj s j' Hhl in rank, skill, judgment, and distin-Vj' ! e ^ services. He had served with the army in011 Peninsula in the battles of Will-Seven Pines, and the Seven Days’l>ai 6S arouiu l Richmond. In the Maryland cam-

ttuis concentrating a large force to move against Rosecrans, crush out his

fr

he

'em ;

made the battle of South Mountain alone

hiou iaoniin ff til late in the afternoon, with live[g e against a large part of McClellan’s army,tlty. loot-note, Vol. II., p. 578.] He also borehow °f the battle of Sliarpsburg. Ho came,li„ a ® Ver > no ^ f rom Virginia but from North Caro-8 tat an< ^ ha<l just been detailed for service in that

tate,

N,

in rank after General D. II. Hill wasH s ® lal Lafayette McLaws , who had served withHi s ^tnuously from the Peninsular campaign.a ttack on Maryland Heights in the campaign

of 1862 was the crowning point in the captureof Harper’s Ferry with its garrison and supplies.With Maryland Heights in our hands Harper’sFerry was untenable. Without Maryland Heightsin our possession Jackson’s forces on the south sideof the Potomac could not have taken the post.At Fredericksburg McLaws held the ground atMarye’s Hill with 5000 men (his own and Ran-som’s division) against 40,000, and put more thandouble his defending forces hors de combat, thusmaking, for his numbers, the best battle of the war.General McLaws was not in vigorous health, how-ever, and was left to command his division in thecampaign. He called on General Lee to know whyhis claims had been overlooked, but I do not knowthat Lee gave him satisfactory reasons.— J. L.

See Colonel William Allan’s comments, to fol-low.— Editobs.