General Hancock’s report bears no date except1863, but a supplemental report, byway of cor-rection, dated October 24th, shows that the paper^as written prior to that time, and during hisconvalescence from the wound received near thee ndof the battle. There are passages in the report■which show a determination on the part of Meade to fight at Pipe Creek. General Hancock says:
“On the morning of July 1st the command marchedto Taneytown, going into bivouac about 11 a. m. I thenProceeded in person to General Meade ’s headquarters,on reporting to him, was informed as to his inten-tion with reference to giving battle to the enemy, theprders for preparatory movements being then ready forissue, a few minutes before 1 p. m. I received ordersto proceed in person to the front and assume command°f the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, in consequenceof the death of Miijor-General Reynolds. Having beenthlly informed by the major-general commanding as to1118 intentions, I was instructed by him to give thehccessary directions upon my arrival at the front forthe movement of troops and trains to the rear towardthe line of battle he had selected, should I deem it ex-pedient to do so. If the ground was suitable, and cir-cumstances made it wise, I was directed to establishthe line of battle at Gettysburg . . . . At 3 p. ji. IJiTived at Gettysburg and assumed the command. Athis time the First and Eleventh corps were retiringhrough the town, closely pursued by the enemy. Thecavalry of General Buford was occupying a firm positioncn the plain to the left of Gettysburg , covering the rear, f the retreating corps. The Third Corps had not yethi'rived from Emmitsburg. Orders were at once givenc establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill, with skir-jhishers occupying that part of the town immediately
1 our front. The position just on the southern edge of
cttysburg, overlooking the town and commanding the
Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads and the Baltimore turnpike, was already partially occupied on my arrivalby direction of Major-General Howard . Some difficultywas experienced in forming the troops of the EleventhCorps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidableline was established to deter the enemy from any seriousassault on the position. They pushed forward a lineof battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of ourartillery. In forming the lines, I received materialassistance from Major-General Howard , Brigadier-Gen-erals Warren and Buford, and officers of General How-ard ’s command. . . . The trains of all the troopsunder my command were ordered to the rear, that theymight not interfere with any movement of troops thatmight be directed by the major-general commanding.My aide, Major Mitchell, was then sent to GeneralMeade to inform him of the state of affairs, and to saythat I would hold the position until night. Shortlyafter, I addressed a communication to the major-generalcommanding, sending it hy Captain Parker, of my staff,giving in detail the information in my possession, andinforming him that the position at Gettysburg was avery strong one, having for its disadvantage that itmight be easily turned, and leaving to him the respon-sibility whether the battle shorild be fought at Gettys-burg or at a place first selected by him. Between 5and 6 o’clock, my dispositions having been completed,Major-General Slocum arrived on the field, and, consid-ering that my functions had ceased, I transferred thecommand to him. The head of the Third Corps ap-peared in sight shortly afterward, on the Emmitsburgroad.
“About dark I started for the headquarters of thearmy, still at Taneytown, thirteen miles distant, andreported in person to General Meade . I then ascer-tained that he had already given orders for the corpsin the rear to advance at once to Gettysburg , and wasabout proceeding there in person.”
General Howard ’s detailed report is dated Au-§hst 31st, 1863, and speaks specifically of thec °urse of events after he took command on theCorning of the First Day’s Battle. He says:
Just at sunset [June 30tli] I received a request frome heral Reynolds, commanding First Corps, to meettti at his headquarters [at Marsh Run, midway between0j r? lu fi 8 hurg and Gettysburg ]. Ho then showed me theoff? 8 ^ roiu your headquarters placing him in commandc tae First, Eleventh, and Third corps; also the cir-kU’s of the commanding general dated June 30th,gethcr with a confidential communication. The pur-im ^ ^ese papers was that a general engagement wasoincnt, the issues involved immense, and all com-R e 11(0318 urged to extraordinary exertions. Generalhif^ 110 ^ 8 aiu l 1 consulted together, comparing notes andjjjJ^uiation until a late hour. I then returned to Em-3 0th^ circular from your headquarters, of Junehii corps commanders to hold their com-
At 8 8 ln rea dhiess to move at a moment’s notice. . . .[£ , A * [July 1st] orders were received from him> bolds] directing the corps to march to Gettysburg .°b w*f ^ 8 80011 as ^ le cor PS was set in motion, I pushedt^ 0 . uiy staff by the direct road, and when within
of Gettysburg received word from Generalc atm _ 8 > Pointing out the place where I was to en-but, on approaching the town, heavy artilleryby ,f Was heard. For some little time I endeavored,ea dibg in different directions, to find General°. s > iu order to report to him in person. In thebur ff f 1In . e 1 went to the top of a high buildingin Gettys-* facing westward. I saw firing beyond Seminary
Ridge and not far from the seminary. Toward the rightmasses of cavalry were drawn up in order, to the east ofthe ridge and to the north-east of the town. A portionof the First Corps, of General Wadsworth’s command,was between me and the seminary, taking position nearthe railroad. Another division of this corps was movingby the flank with consider.able rapidity, along the ridgeand in a north-easterly direction. I had studied theposition a few moments, when a report reached me thatGeneral Reynolds was wounded. At first I hoped hiswound might be slight, and that he would continue tocommand; but in a short time I was undeceived. Hisaide-de-camp, Major [William] Riddle, brought the sadtiding of his death. This was about 11:30 a. m. Priorto this the general had sent me orders to move up atdouble-quick, for he was severely engaged. On liearingofthe death of General Reynolds, I assumed command ofthe left wing, instructing General Schurz to take com-mand of the Eleventh Corps. After an examination of thegeneral features of the country, I came to the conclusionthat the only tenable position for my limited force wasthe ridge to the south-east of Gettysburg , now so wellknown as Cemetery Ridge. The highest point at thecemetery commanded every eminence within easyrange. The slopes toward the west and south weregradual, and could be completely swept by artillery.To the north, the ridge was broken by a ravine runningtransversely. I at once established my headquartersnear the cemetery and on the highest point north of theBaltimore pike. Here General Schurz joined me before12 m., when I instructed him to make the following dis-positions of the Eleventh Corps. Learning from Gen-eral Doubleday, commanding the First Corps, that his
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