288

HANCOCK AND HOWARD IN THE FIRST DAY’S FIGHT.

right was hard pressed, and receiving continued assur-ance that his left was safe and pushing the enemy hack,I ordered the First and Third divisions of the EleventhCorps to seize and hold a prominent height [Oak Hill,which they did not reach — the Confederates gettingthere first.— Editors] on the right of the Cashtown roadand on the prolongation of Seminary Ridge, each di-vision to have a battery of artillery, the other threebatteries, supported by General Bteinwehr’s division(Second), to be put iu position near uie on Cemetery Ilill.

“About 12:30 [i\ m.] General Buford sent me word thatthe enemy was massing between the York and Harris-burg roads, to the north of Gettysburg , some throe orfour miles from the town. Quite a large number ofprisoners had already been taken by the First Corps.They reported that we were engaging Hill’s corps, or a.portion of it, and that an aide of General Longetreethad arrived, stating that he would be up with onedivision in a short time. About this time the headof column of the Eleventh Corps entered and i>assedthrough the town, moving forward rapidly toward theposition ordered. The news of Ewell’s advance fromthe direction of York was confirmed by reports fromGeneral Scliurz, General Buford, and Major Charles IF.Howard, my aide-de-camp, who had been sent iu thatdirection to reconuoiter. I therefore ordered GeneralSchurz to halt his command, to prevent his right flankbeing turned, but to push forward a thick line of skir-mishers to seize the point first indicated [Oak Hill], asa relief and support to the First Corps. Meanwhileword was sent to General Sickles, commanding ThirdCorps, and General Slocum, commanding Twelfth, in-forming them of the situation of affairs, with a requestthat General Sickles forward my dispatch to GeneralMeade . General Sickles was at that time, about 1 r. m.,near Emmitsburg, and General Slocum reported to benear Two Taverns, distant between four and five milesfrom Gettysburg . At 2 p. m. a report of the state ofthings as then existing was sent to General Meade di-rectly. About this time I left my chicf-of-stuff to exe-cute orders, and went to the First Corps. I foundGeneral Doubleday about a quarter of a mile beyondthe seminary. His Third Division was drawn up to hisfront and left, facing toward the north-west, making alarge angle with the ridge. The artillery of this divisionwas engaging the enemy at this time. His First Division(Wadsworth’s) was located a little to the right of therailroad, and his Second Division (Robinson's) on Wads-worth’s right. The First Corps, in this position, made aright angle with the Eleventh Corps, the vertex beingnear the Mummasburg road. The cavalry of GeneralBuford was located mainly upon the flanks. After in-specting the position of the First Corps, and examiningthe topography of that part of the field, I returned tomy former position at the cemetery. About this time(2:45 p. M.) the enemy showed himself in force in frontof the Eleventh Corps. His batteries could he distinctlyseen on a prominent slope between the MumnmHburgand the Harrisburg roads. I'roni this point he openedfire upon the Eleventh Corps, and also more or less en-filading Robinson’s division of the First Corps. Thebatteries attached to the First and Third divisions,Eleventh Corps, immediately replied, and with evidenteffect. One battery of the enemy, a little more than amile north from the cemetery, near the Harrisburg road, could be distinctly seen, and as I had a battery of3-ineh rifled guns, under Wiedrich, near my position, Idirected him to fire, provided he could reach the enemy.Ho did so, but his shells for the most part fell short.Boon after complaint came that they reached no fartherthan our own cavalry; however, I never heard that anyof our own men were killed or wounded by this fire. Thereason of this irregularity was the poor quality of theammunition there used. Subsequently these guns didmost excellent service.

•• I now sent again to General Slocum, stating that myright flank was attacked and asking him if lie was mov-ing up, and stating that I was in danger of being turnedand driven back. Before this my aide-de-camp, Captain[Edward P.] Pearson, had been sent to General Sickles,

requesting him to move up to Gettysburg as rapidly aspossible. Owing to difficulty iu finding General Sickles’sheadquarters, this message was not delivered until3:30 i\ m.

At 3:20 p. m. the enemy renewed his attack upon theFirst Corps, hotly pressing the First and Second divis-ions. Earnest requests were made upon me for rein-forcements, and General Schurz, who was engaged witha force of the enemy much larger than his own, askedfor a brigade to be placed en echelon on his right. I hadthen only two small brigades iu reserve, and hadalready located three regiments from these in the edgeof the town and to the north, and I felt sure that I musthold the point where I was as an ultimate resort-Therefore I at first replied that I could not spare anytrooi>s, but did afterward permit General Steinwebr topush out Colonel Coster's brigade beyond the town, tocover the retreat. General Buford was requested tosupport the center, near the right of the First Corps, aswell {is ho could with his cavalry. A third battery wa flsent to the front, and put in position near the Third Di-vision, Eleventh Corps. At 3:45 p. >r. Generals Double-day and Wadsworth besought mo for reenforeements.1 directed General Schurz, if he could spare one regi-ment or more, to send it to reenforce General Wads-worth, and several times sent urgent requests toGeneral Slocum to come to my assistance. To everyApplication for reenforeements, I replied, “Holdout, i*possible, a while longer, for I am expecting GeneralSlocum every moment.” At this time General Double-day’s left was turned, and troops of the enemy appearedfar outflanking him, and the enemy were also extendingbeyond my right flank. About 4 v. m. I sent word toGeneral Doublcdny that, if he could not hold out longer,lie must fall back, fighting, to Cemetery Hill and on theleft of the Baltimore piko; also a request to GeneralBuford to make a show of force opposite the enemy’®right, which lie immediately did. I now dispatchedMajor Howard, my aide-de-camp, to General Slocum, toinform him of the state of affairs, requesting him to sendone of his divisions to the left, the other to the right ofGettysburg , and that he would come in person to Ceme-tery Hill. lie met the general on the Baltimore pihe.about a mile from Gettysburg , who replied that lie hadalready ordered a division to the right, and that hewoutd send another to cover the loft, as requested, h u Jthat lie did not wish to come up in person to the frontand take the responsibility of that fight. In justice toGeneral Slocum, I desire to say that ho afterward ex-pressed the opinion that it was against the wish of thecommanding general to bring on a general engagementat that point.

“At 4:10 p. m„ finding that I could hold out no longer,and that the troops were already giving way, I sent apositive order to the commanders of the First and EleX'entli corps to fall back gradually, disputing every inchof ground, and to form near my position, the EleventhCorps on the right and the First Corps on the left of theBaltimore pike. General Hteimvehr’s division of t^ eEleventh Corps and the batteries which lie was support'ing were so disposed as to check the enemy attempt 1 ^to come through tlio town, or to approach upon therighor left of Gettysburg . The movement ordered was exe-cuted, though with considerable confusion, on accoun ■of the First and Eleventh corps coming together intown.

“ At 4:30 v. iu. the columns reached Cemetery Hill, thenemy pressing hard. lie made a single attempt, to turour right, ascending the slope north-east of Gettysburg 'but bis line was instantly broken by Wiedrich’s batten*in position on the heights. General Hancock cameme about this time and said General Meade had senhim on hearing the state of affairs; that he had gi^ehim his instructions while under the impression thatwas my senior. We agreed at once that that ”time for talking, and that General Hancock should*?*ther arrange the troops and place the batteries upon tleft of the Baltimore pike, while I should take the r#of the same. In a very short time wo put the troopsposition, as I had previously directed, excepting