A REPLY TO GENERAL LONGSTREET.

battle north of the Potomae — the battle of FallingWaters — where the lamented Pettigrew fell.

Davis’s Mississippi brigade, that fought so gal-lantly on the first day, and crossed bayonets withthe Iron Brigade, had a prominent part in thegrand charge. The 2d Mississippi of that brigadelost half of its men on that day, but was still in-tact, ready and willing to fight, and its courage inthe great charge has become a matter of history.Its battle-flag is in the possession of the old color-hearer, who lives at Blossom Prairie, Texas , andhas the names of more than a score of battlesstamped on it.

35=1

Scales’s and Lane’sNortli Carolina brigades, com-manded by G-eneral Isaac R. Trimble , belonged toGeneral W. D. Pender’s division of A. P. Hill ’scorps, and were 2500 strong. General Pender was mortally wounded on the second day. WhenGeneral Lee saw the men of Scales’s brigade, bleed-ing from wounds received on the first day, he said,“ Many of these poor fellows should go to the rear.”When a brigade would fight under such circum-stances as Scales’s did, it ought not to be robbed ofits military fame. General Trimble was woundedin the charge.

Praiiue Grove, Tex.

A REPLY TO GENERAL LONGSTREET.

BY WILLIAM ALLAN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, C. S. A.

^ eneral Longstreet’s account of Gettysburg [seepp. 244, 339] is notable for its mistakesas well as for its attitude toward General Lee andothers.

First. The statement that General Lee passedover more deserving officers from other States inorder to give the command of his corps to Virgin-l! «is is an unworthy attack upon a man who was assingularly free from such prejudices as he wasfrom self-seeking, either during the war or after it.Lee said in a letter to President Davis, October•^<1, 1802, at the close of the Antietam campaign :

“ In reference to commanders of corps with the rankof lieutenant-general, of which you request my opinion,lean confidently recommend Generals Longstreet andJackson, in this army. My opinion of the merits of Gen-ei 'al Jackson has been greatly enhanced during this ex-pedition. He is true, honest, and bravo; lias a singleto the good of the service, and spares no exertion to^•eoinpiisji his object. Next to these two officers I con-sider General A. P. Hill the best commander with me.■He fights his troops well and takes good care of them.A* present I do not think that more than two commandei> « of corps are necessary for this army.”

This was Lee ’s judgment after a campaign in^hich both the Hills and McLaws had served, andbefore there was any question of makingei ther of them a lieutenant-general. It would bej^bout as just to accuse Lee of undue partiality toGeorgia in making Longstreet liis senior lieuten-as it is to accuse him of partiality to Virginia “i selecting A. P. Hill rather than D. H. Hill orIcLaws for the command of his Third Corps.Second. In regard to the battle of Gettysburg :he fi rs t fiay) s figfit was brought on unexpectedly° Lee . In the absence of Stuart he was not aware

j the proximity of the Federal army. The firstday'

the

operations were very successful. Two of

. seven infantry corps of the Federal army wereRitually demolished, having been defeated and. l * ven in disorder completely from the field, leav-many killed and wounded and several thousandPrisoners to the victors.

-Third, It was at the close of this day’s work thateneral Lee , in view of its results, and of the in-■eations it gave of the position of the Federals j; m y> decided to follow up the fight. General Long-,rp et advised a movement across Meade’s front

to threaten his left and rear. Such a movementwould have been difficult in the absence of Stuart;it could not have been executed in the positionthen occupied by the army with sufficient prompt-ness to surprise Meade ; and if successful it simplywould have forced the Federal army back to someposition nearer Baltimore and Washington wherethe issue of battle was still to be tried. GeneralLongstreet begs the question when he assumesthat Meade would then have been obliged to attackat a disadvantage, General Lee decided that thisplan did not promise as good results as to followup the partial victory already gained. More thanone-fourth of the Federal army was beaten. (Ofthe First and Eleventh corps that had numbered20,931 on June 30th, not 5700 were in line onJuly 2d.) That army was not concentrated, andhours must elapse before its full strength could hemarshaled for battle. The absent portions wouldreach the field jaded by forced marches, to meet thedepressing news of the defeat of their comrades.Doubt and uncertainty would prevail, increasedperhaps by the fact that the present Federal com-mander was so new in his place. Lee ’s troops weremuch more nearly up, only Pickett’s division andLaw’s brigade being out of reach. Not to press theUnion army was to lose the greater part of the ad-vantage of the first day’s victory. The Federalswould soon recover from their depression if notpressed, and his own troops would he disappointed.Lee believed if lie could attack early on the secondday he would have but part of the Federal armyto deal with, and that if he could repeat his successof the first day the gain would be great. He there-fore determined upon attack. On the night of the1st (not on the forenoon of the 2d, as GeneralLongstreet has it) he decided, after a conferencewith Ewell and his division commanders, to makethe attack early next day from his right with Long-street’s two divisions that were within reach, thisattack to be supported by Hill and Ewell. (SeeEwell’s and Early’s reports: Early’s paper in“Southern Historical Society Papers,” Vol. IV.,p. 214; and Long’s “Memoirs of Lee.”)

Fourth. General Longstreet would have us inferthat he was not ordered by General Lee to attackearly on the second day; but that his memory is at