356
A REPLY TO GENERAL LONG STREET.
fault on this point has been abundantly shown byGenerals Fitz Lee , Pendleton, Early, Wilcox, andmany others. No testimony on this point is moredirect and conclusive than that of General A. L.Long, then military secretary to General Lee . Hesays in his recently published “ Memoirs of R. E.Lee” (page 277), that on the evening of the 1st,when General Lee had decided not to renew theattack on Cemetery Hill that day, he said (inLong’s presence) to Longstreet and Hill: “ Gentle-men, we will attack the enemy in the morning asearly as practicable.” Long continues : “ In theconversation that succeeded he [Lee ] directedthem to make the necessary preparations and beready for prompt action the next day.” Longshows plainly that General Lee ’s design was to at-tack the troops in front before the whole Federalarmy could get up, and he describes graphicallythe impatience Lee showed next morning, as earlyas 9 A. M., at Longstreet’s delay. General Long-street is wrong, too, in giving the impression thathis divisions were fifteen or twenty miles away onthe night of the 1st, for in his official report hesays that “McLaws ’s division . . . reached
Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg , a littleafter dark, and Hood’s division [except Law’s bri-gade] got within nearly the same distance of thetown about 12 o’clock at night.” Hood says hewas with his staff “in front of the heights of Get-tysburg shortly after daybreak ” on the 2d, and histroops were close behind. Kershaw (of McLaws ’sdivision) says in his official report that on the 1stof July they “marched to a point on the Gettys-burg road some two miles from that place, goinginto camp at 12 P. M.”
General Longstreet, to explain his delay, be-sides the above reasons scrapes together a numberof others,— such as the presence of some Federalscouts and pickets west of the Emmitsburg road,the movement of Sickles’s rear-guard along thatroad, the presence of one of General Lee ’s engi-neers (who had been sent to give information, notto command his corps). No time need be wastedon these. The fact is that General Longstreet,though knowing fully the condition of things onthe night of the 1st, knowing that Lee had decidedto attack that part of the Federal army in hisfront, knowing that every hour strengthenedMeade and diminished the chances of Confederatesuccess, and knowing that his corps was to openthe battle and deliver the main assault, consumedthe time from daylight to nearly 4 P. m., on July2d, in moving his troops about four miles, over noserious obstacle, and in getting them into battle.Meantime on the Federal side Hancock’s corps,which had camped three miles from Gettysburg ,reached the field by G or 7 A. m. ; Sickles’s twobrigades that had been left at Emmitsburg cameup by 9 A. M. ; the rear of the Fifth Corps bymidday, and the Sixth Corps, after a march of
thirty-two miles in thirty hours, by 2 p. M. HadLongstreet attacked not later than 9 or 10 A. M.,as Lee certainly expected, Siekles’s and Hancock’scorps would have been defeated before the SixthCorps and part of the Fifth arrived. Little RoundTop (which, as it was, the Fifth Corps barely man-aged to seize in time) would have fallen into Con-federate possession; and oven if nothing more hadbeen done this would have given the field to theConfederates, since the Federal line all the way toCemetery Hill was untenable with Round Top inhostile hands.
Fifth. That Longstreet’s attack when made waspoorly seconded by the other corps may be true,and thus another chance of winning a completevictory on July 2d was lost, but this does notchange the fact that the first and great oppor-tunity of that day for the Confederates was lostby Longstreet’s delay.
Sixth. Victory on the third day was for the Con-federates a far more difficult problem than on thesecond, but it was still within their roach. Butone need not be surprised at the failure of Pickett’sattack after reading of the hesitation, the wantof confidence and hearty cooperation, with whichGeneral Longstreet directed it. Lee never in-tended that Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimbleshould fight unsupported by tlio remainder ofthe army. He expected “that with proper con-cert of action . . . we should ultimately suc-
ceed.” (Lee ’s report.) Longstreet was directedto use his whole corps, and when he felt embar-rassed by the Federal forces on or near the RoundTops he was given a division and a half from A-P. Hill’s corps, with power to call for more.General Long says: “The original intention olGeneral Lee was that Pickett’s attack should besupported by the divisions of McLaws and Hood,and General Longstreet was so ordered.” (“ Mem-oirs of Lee,” p. 294. See also statements ofColonels Venable and Taylor, “Four Years withGeneral Lee, ” p. 108.) Leo’s efforts for a con-certed attack were ineffectual. Pickett was over-whelmed not by troops in front but by those onhis flanks, especially by those on his right flank,where Wilcox was sent forward too late to be ofuse, and where he was too weak to have effectedmuch at best. Yet Longstreet did not use anypart of Hood’s and McLaws ’s divisions to supportPickett, or to make a diversion in his favor, or tooccupy the troops on his flank which finally de-foated him. These divisions were practically idle*except that one of Hood’s brigades was occupiedin driving off the Federal cavalry which madea dash on that flank. Longstreet, in a word,sent forward one-third of his corps to the at-tack, but the remainder of his troops did notcooperate. And yet ho reproaches Lee for theresult!
McDonouii, Mu., February 10th, 1887.