4M
THE MEADE-SICKLES CONTROVERSY.
previous order. To my inquiry why Lee had re-strained him, he said our troops coming up(Slocum’s) were visible,- and Lee was under theimpression that the greater part of my army wason the ground and deemed it prudential to awaitthe rest of his —as you quote from his report.
But suppose Ewell with 20,000 men had occu-pied Culp’s Hill, and our brave soldiers had beencompelled to evacuate Cemetery Ridge and with-draw on the roads above referred to, would the PipeCreek order have been so very much out of place ?
That order was to meet the very contingencyhere in question, to wit: A part of my army, over-whelmed by superior numbers, compelled to fallback, and a line of battle, formed to the rear of mymost advanced position, thus necessitated.
As to General Sickles having by his advancebrought on an attack, and thus compelled the bat-tle which decided the war, you have completelyanswered—and it is a very favorite theory withthe partisans of this officer. But these gentlemenignore the fact that of the 18,000 men killed andwounded on the field during the whole battle morethan two-thirds were lost on the second day, andbut for the timely advance of the Fifth Corps andthe prompt sending a portion on Round Top, wherethey met the enemy almost on the crest and had adesperate fight to secure the position —I say butfor these circumstances, over which Sickles hadneither knowledge nor control, the enemy wouldhave secured Round Top, planted his artillerythere, commanding the whole battle-field, and whatthe result would have been I leave you to judge.Now, when I wrote my report of the battle Ihonestly believed General Sickles did not knowwhere I wished him to go, and that his error arosefrom a misapprehension of my orders; but I haverecently learned from General Geary, who had theday before been sent by Hancock to hold the left,and who in doing so had seen the great importanceof Round Top, and posted a brigade on it, that onthe morning of the 2d, when lie received my orderthat he would be relieved by the Third Corps andon being relieved would rejoin his own corps(Twelfth) on the right, after waiting for some
time to be relieved he sent to General Sickles astaff-officer with instructions to explain the posi-tion and its importance, and to ask, if troopscould not be sent to relieve him, that GeneralSickles would send one of his staff to see theground, and to place troops there on their arrival.He received for reply that General Sickles wouldattend to it in due time. No officer or troops came,and after waiting till his patience was exhaustedGeneral Geary withdrew and joined his corps. Nowmy first orders to General Sickles were to relievethe Twelfth Corps division (Geary’s) and occupytheir position. Here is evidence that he knew theposition occupied by Geary’s division, or could haveknown, and yet failed to occupy it. Furthermore,when he came to my headquarters at about noonand said lie did not know where to go, I answered,“ Why you were to relieve the Twelfth Corps.”He said they had no position ; they were massed,awaiting events. Then it was I told him his rightwas to be Hancock's left, his left on Round Top,which I pointed out. Now his right was three-quar-ters of a mile in front of Hancock’s left and hisleft one-quarter of a mile in front of the base ofRound Top, leaving that keij-point unoccupied,which ought to have been occupied by Longstreetbefore we could get there with the Fifth Corps.Sickles ’s movement practically destroyed his owncorps, the Third, caused a loss of 50 per cent, inthe Fifth Corps, and very heavily damaged theSecond Corps ; as I said before, producing GO percent, of the loss of the whole battle ; and withwhat result? — driving us back to the position hewas ordered to hold originally. These losses of thefirst and second day affected greatly the efficiencyand morale of the army and prevented my havingthe audacity in the offense that I might otherwisehave had.
If this is an advantage — to bo so crippled inbattle without attaining an object — I must confessI cannot see it.
Pardon my writing with so much prolixity, butyour generous defense and the clear viow you havetaken of the battle have led me to wander thus far.
Very truly yours, Guo. G. Meade.
Only a cursory perusal of General Meade ’s lettersuggests the reason why he wished it treated asconfidential. It must have been written withoutdeliberation, without revision, and without com-parison with the official records. It contradictshis own official report of the battle made in Octo-ber, 18 03, and his testimony before the Committeeon the Conduct of the War, in March, 18G4.
General Meade is altogether mistaken in speak-ing of charges and insinuations and attacks uponhim made by me. I have never spoken of hisconduct at Gettysburg except in my testimonybefore the Committee on the Conduct of the War,in February, 18G4. General Meade ’s testimonywas given in the following month and with full
knowledge of all my statements, no no of whichwere contradicted by him when ho testified. Thereport of the Committee on the Conduct of the Warjustified me and censured General. Meade .
It must not bo supposed that General Meade hada controversy with mo only. Other corps com-manders made protests when I was silent. Iwill only speak now of one or two as examples.Immediately after Gen oral Meade ’s report of thebattle of Gettysburg , Major-General Slocum, com-manding the right wing of the Army of the Poto-mac at Gettysburg , in an official communicationto General Meade , arraigned him for a series ofinaccuracies, to use the mildest phrase, in GeneralMeade’s official report of Gettysburg , by which