THE MEADE-SICKLES CONTROVERSY.

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grave injustice was done to Major-General Slocumand the corps under his command. After recitingso much of General Meade ’s report as relates to theoperations of his command, General Slocum says :“Yet the facts in the case are very nearly thereverse of the above in every particular, anddirectly in contradiction to the facts as setforth in the reports of General Geary and GeneralWilliams.”

Brigadier-Gefteral Williams, commanding theTwelfth Corps, in an official communication to Ma-jor-General Slocum, dated December 26th, 1863,points out four serious misstatements in GeneralMeade ’s official report relating to the operations ofthe Twelfth Corps on the 2d of July. The characterof these complaints will be understood when I quotefrom General Williams that they consist “in whollyignoring the operations of the First Division ” and“in repudiating most of the material statementsof my report as temporary commander of this armycorps” ; also “in ignoring the splendid conduct ofGreene’s brigade, which held our intrenched lineon the right,” and in giving credit for Greene’sfight to Geary’s division, which was not in thefight at all, but got lost on the road to Two Tav-erns. General Williams concludes Ms protest inthese words, referring to General Meade ’s officialreport of Gettysburg : “I confess to have read thatpart of his official report relating to the TwelfthCorps with a mixed feeling of astonishment andregret.” \

I could amplify similar proofs, showing the char-acteristic inaccuracy of General Meade in his offi-cial reports of his military operations, but will nothow trespass upon your space in that direction.General Meade knew nothing of Gettysburg . Heso stated to the Committee on the Conduct of theWar. He speaks of Gettysburg in these words:“ A place I had never seen in my life and had nohiore knowledge of than you have now ” (address-ing the committee). This is not said censoriously,for General Meade had only been in command threedays and had already chosen another battle-field,°n the line of Pipe Clay Creek, twenty miles dis-tant. General Meade was drawn to Gettysburg inspite of his plans, because Lee had chosen Gettys-burg as his place of concentration, and becauseSuford and Reynolds had accepted battle there,forcing General Meade to give up his Pipe Creekiine and come to Gettysburg . I assisted in this, first,by moving my corps twelve miles from Emmitsburgto Gettysburg , on the afternoon of July 1st, to helpHoward after Reynolds fell; also by my letter toGeneral Meade, written at Gettysburg at 9 o’clock°n the night of July 1st, asking his approval of myMarch, made without orders, and urging him toe ome to Gettysburg with his army, describing it as

a good place to fight a battle,” and pointing outf° him that its weak place would be “on his left,”as it proved to be the next day, when I was un-supported for two hours in resisting Longstreet’sAssault. After General Meade had brought hisforces up to Gettysburg and had reconnoiteredfbe position, he was dissatisfied, and frequently

spoke of it, during the 2d, as “no place to fight abattle.” He so expressed himself in the councilof war held on the night of the 2d. After thiscouncil had decided to stay and fight it out,General Slocum thus describes what took place:General Meade said, “ Well, gentlemen, the ques-tion is settled; we will remain here; but I wish tosay that I consider this no place to fight a battle.”This was after the combats of the 1st and 2d ofJuly, and after twenty thousand Union soldiershad fallen on that field.

General Meade seemed to manifest resentmentagainst every corps commander who had been in-strumental in the choice of Gettysburg as our bat-tle-field. He owed his splendid position there toBuford, Reynolds, and Howard, and the divisionsof Wadsworth, Doubleday, and Robinson. Yet allof these officers, except Reynolds, who was killed,suffered marks of his displeasure or were mentionedwith the scantiest recognition of their heroic con-duct. In Howard’s case Congress interposed to dohim justice, when he received its formal vote ofthanks for his choice of our position on CemeteryRidge, the Gibraltar of Gettysburg .

General Meade was surprised by the attack ofLongstreet, on the Union left, on the afternoon ofthe 2d of July. No preparations whatever weremade by the commanding general to meet Long-street’s assault. There was no order of battle.General Meade had not personally reconnoiteredthe position, though frequently solicited by GeneralHunt, General Meade ’s chief of artillery, GeneralWarren, his chief of engineers, and myself, to doso. This appears in the testimony of GeneralHunt and in the report of General Tremain, mysenior aide-de-camp. Not only was no preparationmade by General Meade to meet the attack uponhis left,— the position I held,—but he deprived meand himself of the most effective support he hadon his left flank by the unaccountable withdrawalof Buford’s division of cavalry, which held theEmmitsburg road and covered our left flank, in-cluding Round Top, until a late hour on the morn-ing of the 2d. Geary’s division of infantry hadbeen withdrawn from the left very early in themorning of the 2d. These dispositions imposedupon me, thus weakened by the withdrawal of twodivisions, the sole responsibility of resisting theformidable attack of General Lee upon our leftflank. The first support that reached me wasBarnes’s division of the Fifth Corps; it got intoposition after 5 o’clock in the afternoon, two hoursafter the battle opened.

The Comte de Paris, in his critical history ofthe war, incomparably the ablest yet written, thusspeaks of the withdrawal of General Buford’sdivision:

“ One of those blunders that frequently occur on thebattle-field was the means of compromising the safety ofthe Federal line just in that part which will ho the firstto be menaced.”

This was my front. The Count continues :

“ Buford alone covered this flank. Meade only learnedthis fact at 1 o’clock. He immediately directed Pleason-

\ See foot-note, p. 316 .—Editors.