416

THE MEADE-SICKLES CONTROVERSY.

ton not to strip him entirely, hut it is too late. Bufordis gone; Merritt, who is coining from Eminitsburg, isstill far away, and Sickles has therefore only the skir-mishers of his infantry to watch the movements of theenemy, whose numerous indications reveal his presencein force on that side. . . . when, shortly after,Sickles, being apprised of the untimely departure ofBuford, decided, in order to ward off all surprise, toreplace him by causing his whole line of skirmishers toadvance as far as the Eminitsburg road. This general,whose military instinct has fathomed the enemy’s inten-tions, justly suspecting that Lee ’s main effort wouldshortly be directed against that portion of the Federalliue which has been intrusted to him, . . . has chargedColonel Berdan to push forward a reconnoissance. . . .This . . . has revealed the presence of a numerousenemy, who is masking his movements and seems dis-posed to turn the Federal left. In the meanwhileSickles, thinking only of the attack with which hebelieves himself menaced, has requested Meade to sendhim fresh instructions: . . . receiving no reply, herepairs to headquarters for the purpose of obtainingthem. ... he immediately requests his chief eitherto ascertain for himself the necessity for making thismovement, or to send General Warren to settle the mat-ter in his place. Meade , being under the impression, nodoubt, that the attack of the enemy would not be aimedat his left, . . . declined either to leave his headquar-ters or to separate himself from General Warren.”

Unfortunately, General Meade ’s whole attention,tactically, was fixed upon his right flank. He didnot believe that the enemy would attack his left,although Hancock and myself had both of uspointed out that his left was his vulnerable pointfor attack. Apart from this tactical preoccupationon his right, General Meade , as I have already said,did not like Gettysburg as a battle-field and wantedto get away from it. Hence we can understand,and in another way, the withdrawal of Geary andBuford from the left and his failure to send timelyreinforcements to the almost uncovered left flank.At 3 o’clock in the afternoon of July 2d, a few mo-ments before Longstreet opened his assault, Meade telegraphed to Halleck: “If satisfied the enemyis endeavoring to move to my rear, I shall fall backto my supplies at Westminster.” He had alreadysent Buford there, two hours before. GeneralMeade ’s cliief-of-cavalry, Major-General AlfredPleasonton, states that in the afternoon of the2d of July General Meade “gave me the order toget what cavalry and artillery I could as soon aspossible, and take up a position in the rear to coverthe retreat of the army from Gettysburg . I wasthus occupied until 10 o’clock at night, when Iwas recalled by an order from General Meade .”

Meanwhile, although General Meade had noorder of battle, although his chief-of-artillery,General Hunt, as he states in his testimony, knewnothing of the intentions of his commanding gen-eral, whether to stay or to go, or whether his tacticswere offensive or defensive if he staid; while his leftflank was being stripped of cavalry and of infan-try vital to its protection; while the commanderof the Third Corps, General Sickles, was left un-supported and without definite instructions, all wasdifferent on the side of the enemy. Prom early dawnon the morning of the 2d General Lee , with his lieu-tenants and his staff, was in the saddle carefullyreconnoitering our left and making elaborate prep-arations for the assault made at a later hour.General Lee promulgated his order of battle. He

placed his infantry and his artillery in position.He designated the divisions of his center and leftto support Longstreet’s assault. These dispositionsmade by General Lee were disclosed by reconnois-sances made by General Birney, one of the greatestsoldiers produced by Pennsylvania . Birney com-manded my left division. To his vigilance and un-erring military intuition General Meade owed thetimely warnings, again and again repeated by my-self and General Tremain, my senior aide, of theenemy’s movements imperiling the left flank of ourarmy. All admonitions were unheeded, derided.General Meade declined to accept any suggestionthat his left was in danger of attack.

It is a significant fact, never contradicted, thatat the moment when the battle of the 2d began,General Meade was in consultation with his corpscommanders, a consultation which I was calledaway from my front to attend. Binding myself inthe presence of the enemy, I asked to be excusedfrom attending the council of war. I was at onceperemptorily ordered to repair to General Meade ’sheadquarters. The report of my aide-de-camp thatI was momentarily expecting to bo engaged withthe enemy was disregarded, and the order to leavemy command and report to headquarters was madeimperative. While I was on my way to headquar-ters the battle began on my front. General Meade met me at the door of his house, excused mefrom dismounting, authorized me to return to mycommand, and said he would follow immediately.This broke up the council, and the corps com-manders repaired to their commands. This was at3 in the afternoon. General Meade soon after-ward met me at the front and witnessed the dis-positions which I was making, and which he didnot modify. And from that hour until G o’clock,when I was wounded, I did not receive any orderor instruction whatever from General Meade as tothe conduct of the battle.

The truth is that when I was summoned to head-quarters at 3 o’clock in the afternoon to attend thiscouncil of war, I had become weary of so manyvisits to headquarters during the day. Besidesmy own repeated requests made in person to Gen-eral Meade for instructions, General Tremain andColonel Moore, my aides, had been sent againand again to General Meade with reports of theenemy’s movements on bis left and with urgentrepresentations from me of the necessity of properdispositions and of reenforcements.

General Meade states in his confidential letterto Colonel Benedict: “When Sickles came to inyheadquarters about noon and said lie did not knowwhere to go I answered, ‘ Why, you were to relievethe Twelfth Corps.’ He said they had no position ;they were massed awaiting events.” To this Ianswer from the record: First, that the TwelfthCorps was never at any time, until the very closeof the battle on the 2d of July, in position on theleft. The position of the Twelfth Corps during allthe day of the 2d was on the right flank, milesaway from the left—as far away as Culp’s Hill isfrom Bound Top ; second, that Geary’s division ofthe Twelfth Corps was ordered by Goneral Han-cock, on the evening of July 1st, “to the high