4
Pemberton, at my request, gave an estimate of the minimum force requisite,in his opinion, for the department, namely, 43,650 men of all arms, which Iadopted as the basis of my future calculations.
On the 30th of September, and again on the 2d of October, I urgently calledon the War Department for an increase of heavy ordnance for the worksintended to command the anchorage in the Charleston harbor and theentrance into the Ashley and Cooper rivers. I asked for twenty 10-inchColumbiads, five banded rifled 42-pounders, and five banded 32-pounders; or“ fifteen of the first quality, ten of the second, and five or more of the third.”The Secretary of War, Mr. Randolph, had used every endeavor to assist mein my efforts to be ready for the impending attack of the enemy; but he hadjust at this time, unfortunately, tendered his resignation, and had been suc-ceeded in office by Mr. Seddon. From that moment my demands on the WarDepartment seemed to meet with much less favor, and I had to rely, in agreat measure, on the scant resources of my command to accomplish the worknecessary for the safety of the city of Charleston . The State authorities, andin fact the whole people of South Carolina , were equally anxious with myselffor the rapid completion of my preparations, and afforded me every assistancein their power, though I was never able to procure the necessary amount ofslave-labor required for work on the fortifications. By great exertion, andwith no assistance from the Government, was executed under my orders therifling and banding of guns otherwise too inferior for the proper armamentof our works. This was done at the rate of one gun in two and a half days,whereas it had required thirty-five days to remodel each gun under the super-vision of the War Department .
My anxiety was all the greater since the enemy, before making his finalattack upon Charleston , and with a view, no doubt, to distract attention fromit, had been for some time past preparing a descent along the Southern Atlan-tic coast, though he afterward appeared to have altered his original purposeand to be directing his course toward Cape Lookout, on the coast of NorthCarolina . With the inadequate force under me, my only hope was toendeavor to frustrate any demonstration that might be attempted within thelimits of my own extensive command; and yet the War Department , throughthe new Secretary of War, was at that very time, and against repeated pro-tests on my part, depleting it of troops to reenforce other points.
The approaches to Charleston were five in number: 1. The enemy couldland a large force to the northward, at or in the close vicinity of Bull’s Bay,and from thence, marching across the country, could take possession of MountPleasant and all the north shore of the inner harbor. 2. A large force of theenemy could also land to the southward, destroy the Charleston and Savan-nah railroad, and invest Charleston in the rear. These two avenues ofapproach, however, were not likely to be adopted by the enemy, as thestrength of his land force would not have justified such an attempt, unaidedby his iron-clads and gun-boats. The cooperation of the Federal fleet waspossible for any one of the other three modes of approach, namely: JamesIsland, Sullivan’s Island, and Morris Island. 3. Of these, the approach by