THE DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON.
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C/Y A/iB
James Island was unquestionably the one to be most apprehended. The Con-federate troops stationed there were insufficient in number and had to defend“a long, defective, and irregular line of works.” The enemy, after overpow-ering them, could have constructed batteries which would have controlled theinner harbor, taken in rear our outer lines of defenses, and opened fire directlyagainst Charleston itself, thus forcing an almost immediate surrender. 4. BySullivan’s Island the approach was also a very important one. In taking it,Fort Sumter might have been silenced and the inner harbor thrown open tothe enemy’s iron-clad fleet. 5. The approach by Morris Island was, as after-ward proved, the least dangerous to us. It involved none of the contingen-cies threatened by the other modes of attack. It had always been my opinion,however, that the enemy would elect to make his approach by that route, forthe reason that, being already in possession of Folly Island, which was in closeproximity to Morris Island, he would thereby enjoy certain facilities for themovements of his troops, while close at hand lay the harbor of Edisto, con-venient as a shelter for his fleet. The seizure of Morris Island would also bea great encouragement to the North.
The preparations of the North were upon a scale of such magnitude—withengines of war “such as the hand of man had never yet put afloat ”—that theyhad consumed more time than was at first anticipated. Thus an opportunitywas afforded me to perfect our means of resistance.
Weeks and months went by, during which I succeeded in nearly doublingthe strength of Sumter, of Moultrie, and of all the defensive works of the liar-f'or, including Battery Wagner, which was thus almost entirely rebuilt. Ialso established along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida acontinuous line of signal (flag) stations, by means of which constant informa-tion was furnished department headquarters of the exact movement and ofthe least change that took place in the Federal fleet. I multiplied the layingout of torpedoes in all navigable streams liable to be ascended by Federal gun-boats and other craft, and gave close attention to the rope obstructions divid-ing the outer and inner harbors. I likewise used my best endeavors, andimportuned the War and Navy Departments, to have constructed a few “ tor-pedo-rains,” on the model by Captain F. D. Lee, with which it was my firmconviction more injury could be inflicted upon the Federal fleet than couldFe hoped for from all such gun-boats as the Government was then having