54

THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863.

forces under General H. W. Benliam, on tlie 16th of June, 1862, and hadbeen greatly strengthened since that time.

A gallant and well-directed attack upon Fort Sumter on April 7th, 1863, bya squadron composed of nine iron-clad vessels, under command of Rear-Admi-ral Du Pont , had signally failed, after a sharp engagement lasting about onehour. [See p. 32.] The squadron carried 15-inch and 11-inch shell guns and150-pounder Parrott rifles. Five of the iron-clads were reported by theirrespective commanders to be wholly or partly disabled in their power ofinflicting injury by their guns. They had been under the concentrated fireof some of the most destructive guns of that period for nearly one hour,although they did not advance far enough to draw the fire of some of theheaviest pieces in Fort Sumter. The thin-armored Keokuk was so seriouslyinjured that she sank the following morning off Morris Island, and her arma-ment fell into the hands of the enemy. The fleet received the fire from theSullivan’s Island, the Morris Island, and the Mount Pleasant batteries, as wellas from Fort Sumter, and during the attack divided its own fire between FortWagner, Fort Sumter, and Fort Moultrie. After this repulse Admiral Du Pont expressed the opinion that Charleston could not be taken by a purely navalattack, and some of his subordinate commanders held similar views. AtWashington it was deemed of so much importance to present an activelyaggressive front in this quarter in aid of projected operations elsewhere thatorders were issued by the President himself to hold the position inside ofCharleston bar, and to prevent the erection of new batteries and new defenseson Morris Island, and if such batteries had been begun by the enemy to “drivehim out.” A keen sense of disappointment pervaded the Navy Departmentat the repulse of April 7tli, finding expression, among the higher officials, ina determination to retrieve the fortunes of that day, and reinstate the iron-clads in the confidence of the country at the earliest possible moment. Thegallantry of the attack, the skill with which the fleet had been handled, theterrific fire to which it had been exposed, and the prudence that prompted itsrecall before a simple repulse could bo converted into overwhelming disasterwex - e measurably lost sight of in the chagrin of defeat. The disheartening factwas that the iron-clads had conspicuously failed in the very work for whichthey had been supposed to be peculiarly fit, and the country had nothingwhatever to take their place.

Late in May I was called to Washington, J and was informed at the consul-tations which followed that it was the intention to make another attack withthe iron-clads, provided Fort Bumter, which was regarded as the most for-midable obstacle and the key of the position, could lie eliminated from theconflict, so that the fleet could pass up on the south side of the channel, leav-ing Fort Moultrie and the other Sullivan’s Island works nearly a mile to theright. The army was therefore asked if it could cooperate to the extent ofdestroying the offensive power of Fort Sumter. I expressed the opinion thatFort Sumter could be reduced and its offensive power entirely destroyed with

i General Gilhuore was on leave of absence at this time. From September lStli, 1802, to April,1803, he had held important commands in Kentucky and West Virginia.— Editors.

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