THE ARMY BEFORE CHARLESTON IN 1863.

55

rifle guns, planted on Morris Island, and that beyond the capture of that islandail d the demolition of the fort, the available land forces, numbering scarcelyeleven thousand men of all arms, could not take the initiative in any opera-tion against Charleston that would involve their leaving the sea islands, upon^fliich the enemy derived no advantage from his superior strength or fromthe railroad facilities under his control for concentrating troops and bringing^enforcements from the interior on short notice. It was finally decided thatthe army should 11 ndertake the capture of Morris Island and the reduction of°i’t Sumter, unless it should become necessary, before preparations for theattack were completed, to detach some of the troops for the purpose of reen-°rcing General Grant or General Banks, then operating on the Mississippi ;ail( l it was announced with emphasis that no additional troops would be sentl 10 South Carolina . The capture of the city by a land attack was not, in anySe Qse, the object of these operations. No project of that nature was dis-used or even mentioned at the conference.

The following general plan of campaign was agreed upon, comprising fourls tinct steps, and the army was to take the lead in executing the first, second,ail d third. First, to make a descent upon and obtain possession of the southeiK i of Morris Island, then held by the enemy with infantry and artillery;See °nd, to lay siege to and reduce Battery Wagner, a strong and well-armed® a i'th-work, located near the north end of Morris Island, about 2600 yardsu>ln Fort Sumter; with Battery Wagner the works at Cumming’s Point, theextreme north end of the island, would also fall; third, from the position thuss ocured on Morris Island to destroy Fort Sumter with breaching batteries ofPile guns, and afterward by a heavy artillery fire cooperate with the fleet whenshould be ready to move in; fourth, the fleet to enter, remove the channeldestructions if any should be encountered, run by the batteries on James andMlivan’s islands, and reach the city. For the special purpose of this con-e "fiflated attack Bear-Admiral Andrew H. Foote, an officer of tried braverycool and mature judgment, was assigned to the command of the SouthPantic blockading squadron, comprising the naval forces available for°Perations against Charleston ; but he was not permitted to enter upon thisfield of labor, his sudden and untimely death leaving the command withe ar-Admiral John A. Dalilgren. [See p. 46.]

. Charleston was located in the Military Department of the South, compris-ph' Ihe narrow strip of sea-coast held by the Union forces in South Carolina ,0r gia, and Florida . Upon relieving General David Hunter and assumingc °ttunaud of this department in June, I found our troops actually occupyingVe n positions on this stretch of coast, while a small blockading squadronda variable and more or less imperfect control of the principal inlets. InIsf ^^hborhood of Charleston we held all the coast line south of Morrisand, while all the other islands around the harbor, and to the northward,• , ! e < -h her controlled or occupied by the enemy. It was found, after abol-lll g some of these detached posts and reducing the force at others, that theton' e ^ a ^ e me ans for carrying on the contemplated operations against Charles-comprised only about 10,000 effective volunteer infantry, 600 engineer