when separated from the body. 255

point in reason and philosophy; for we can-not go beyond the natures of things ; or be-yond that power which is the origin of thenatures of things, without demanding thatthe foul itself should be independent. All xthat men want is to be satisfied that power be-longs to the nature of the foul itself, in op-position to its belonging to matter. And in-deed it is absolutely necessary that, as onespecies of substance [matter] is utterly inac-tive, by its nature and constitution; so ano-ther species of it [spirit] should have activityand power, by its nature and constitution.This, I fay, is absolutely necessary; other-wise we should make activity and power a mereaccident in nature , which is prodigiously ab-surd. Wherefore we must say (as before)that the foul hath the power of action,when not united to the body; or after it isseparated from it.

IV. If the soul hath the power of actionwhen not united to the body, it must certain-ly have the capacity of perceiving then also :for to be actve, without being percipient ofthe action, is to be active, not from an inter-nal principle, or the power of action, butfrom mechanical necessity , imposed by some-thing