256 The soul necessarily living .,

thing from without. To be active impliesthe will to act. If anything acts without will-ing the action, it either acts against its will,and then it is a percipient conscious being ;though rather forced than willing, in this cafe:or if it cannot have will either for or againstthe action, it is a mechanical instrument of ac-tion only, and no agent. Indeed activity im-ports to be living, and life without perceptionis not to be conceived : so that activity in-cludes perceptivity in itself; and whatevernecessity there is for the soul’s being active ina separate state, the same there is also for itsbeing percipient then (c).

(c) We fee some inferior creatures, that do not changeplace, almost quite divested of active power, whoso per-ception is yet indesinent. And if we will reason fromour own experience, our active power is much more li-able to be impaired, than our perceptive capacity. If wecannot have activity or lay it aside at our pleasure, ^will still appear more plain in going on; common sensedictates to us, that it is still less in our power to have 2capacity or lay it aside, at pleasure. Perception is oste stmore intense, or heightened, where the active powerweakened, with respect to our bodies; and because i £ lSweakened, as in a gouty limb. In short, die very l owr 'est kind of life seems to consist in the perceptive capacity*so that we can never imagine this removed from a livingbeing. These several considerations may help us to O"vercome our prejudices in this particular.

I V. But