322 The soul necessarily livings

will, I hope, plead my excuse for offeringan essay on that intricate subject.

XXII. We may farther observe, the firstnine paragraphs of this section-being dutyconsidered, that they who placed the essenceof the soul in thinking, rather expressed theirmeaning unwarily, than had false conceptionsof the nature of it. If estence and existencehave different meanings (as in proprietyseems they should), by essence, I think, canonly be meant, the abstract natures of things»or the ideas of the things in the divine intel-lect, which were before the things themseW eSexisted. Mr. Locke rather takes essence s° fthe being of any thing (r);' though we usn-

(r)

t , j -— “ But since the essences of things af6

thought by some (and not without reason) to be wh°^« ly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider ^“ several significations of the word essence. First e“ fence may be taken for the being of any things wb ese44 by it is what it is, and thus the real internal, D ^44 generally in substances, unknown constitution41 things, whereon their discoverable qualities4C may be called their essence. This is the proper“ ginal signification of the word, as is evident from^44 formation of it; ejsentia in its primary notation,

" nifying properly being, tfc.” B. 3. eb.