when separated sr dm the body. 323

ally say, such a property is of the nature orejsence of a thing, taking cither word indif-ferently j

Here (not to mention that it is not extraordinary for the%nification of a derivative word, especially in a philoso-phical acceptation, to differ very widely from the gram-matical meaning it might have according to the form itis derived in) the word {being] I think, is equivocal,and signifies the internal unknown conjliiution of things ,hfs properly, at least less commonly, than any otherthing. The being of a thing is oftenest taken in oppositionto the not-being of it» and then it is the fame as the ex-istence of it. We fay such a thing is riot in being » Andsometimes it imports both essence and existence; as whenWe fay we have our being from God ; that is, both outexistence, and our nature or essence. But grariting thatoffence^ being , and the internal unknown conjtitution of sub-stances, are properly the fame thing; since this internalUnknown constitution once existed not, and yet wasknown then in the Divine Intelleff, it must have been isl dea there. So that at last, in any acceptation of theWord, we must resolve the essente of things into idea§*nd make it the fame with their nature.

There is one thing farther may be observed from theplace here cited. Mr. Locke allows that the internal,un-known constitution of things is something ; since theirdiscoverable qualities are owned to depend on this; which,1 think, is very right, for qualities cannot depend on no-thing, This is taken notice of, because sceptical menkegin to suppose they have Mr. Locke’s authority for in-itiating that the unknown constitution of things is iaY % itself