Z 26 e fh&soulmcejfarily livings

as we fee it doth. And therefore it can ne-»ver be without them. Solidity seems notmore necessary to the conception of mattesthan activity and perceptivity to the concep-tion of spirit. And since considered abso-lutely in itself, it cannot not exercise thesepowers j the justest idea of it is, that of ast(iBi-ve perceptive beings which we cannotconceive in itself, without real action andperception. Mr. Locke says, it is not neces-sary to suppose the soul always in action,and that thinking may be to the soul whatmotion is to the body: not its esience, butone of its operations (j). But with submission

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(s) " 1 confess myself to have one of those dull souls,," that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate* c ideas, nor can conceive it any more neceslary (0 {" the foul always to think, than for the body always to“ move; the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) t0" the foul, what motion is to the body, not its essence,but one of its operations; and therefore though think'" ing be supposed never so much the proper action“ the foul j yet it is not neceslary to suppose that‘‘ should be always thinking, always in action. Th^“ perhaps is the privilege of the infinite Author and P rSserver of things, who never slumbers nor sleeps, b llt" is not competent to any finite being, at least not tothe foul of man. We know certainly by experience

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