when separated from the body . 325

Crcise of this power at any time. So that,if they had made a distinction between a5ti-vity and real atfion^nd excepted some cer-tain intervals of inaction perhaps (thoughnone of this caution was absolutely necessary,as will appear immediately); no body couldhave taken exception to their opinion. IfWe take away from our complex idea of asubstance, the particular ideas of those pro-perties, by which only we collect that it is asubstance, we take such complex idea quiteaway; since it consists only of those particu-lar ideas. If we take away from our idea ofmatter, those of solidity and extension, weleave ourselves no idea of it remaining. Af-ter the fame manner, if we deny activity andperceptivity concerning spiritual substance,by which we can only collect it to be a sub-stance, we deny every thing we know con-cerning it; or we deny ourselves to have anyidea of it; and reasoning about it as withoutthese powers, we reason precisely about no-thing, of which we have any particular idea.To say it may still be a substance withoutthese powers, is to suppose it dead*substance,which could never come to the exercise ofthese powers again if it had once lost themY 3